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ABSTRACT
Anyone who has climbed a mountain before knows that the
perceived distance walked depends on more than just its phys-
ical length. This intriguing relationship between physical and
experienced magnitudes has fascinated researchers across var-
ious disciplines for more than 200 years. Part of the enthusi-
asm is driven by the fact that, although magnitudes, as well as
the sensory organs with which we measure them, differ in so
many ways, there are unifying principles in behavior common
to all types of magnitudes estimated. In this thesis, the gen-
eral characteristics of human magnitude estimation are studied
in the case of visual path integration. The aim is to clarify the
role of a-priori knowledge on the estimate of magnitude and to
provide a unifying mathematical framework that explains the
behavior. In particular, we investigated human linear and angu-
lar displacement estimation in different experimental situations
with varying experience-dependent and abstract a-priori knowl-
edge. We find systematic behavioral characteristics that are om-
nipresent in magnitude estimation studies, like the range effect,
the regression effect or scalar variability. These characteristics
are explained by a general model that combines a logarithmic
scaling of magnitudes according to the Weber-Fechner law with
the concept of Bayesian inference. The model incorporates a-
priori knowledge about the stimulus and updates this knowl-
edge on a trial-by-trial basis. The resulting iterative Bayesian
estimation accounts for the aforementioned behavioral charac-
teristics and provides a link between the two most well-known
laws in psychophysics: the Weber-Fechner and Stevens’ power-
law. This work provides substantial evidence that magnitude
estimation is not purely driven by sensation but underlies per-
ceptual estimation processes that exploit and incorporate differ-
ent types of information sources, in particular short-term prior
experience. The proposed mathematical framework is likely ap-
plicable to magnitude estimation across different modalities and
consequently contributes to a unifying account of the behavior.
ix
xOVERV IEW
The thesis is structured in four main chapters. In the introduc-
tion, I will review general findings in human magnitude esti-
mation behavior, the psychophysical laws of Weber-Fechner and
Stevens and characteristic deviations from these laws. I will re-
late these findings to a probabilistic understanding of perception
as Bayesian inference.
The research is presented in form of two articles published in
peer-reviewed journals, that are included in separate chapters.
Each chapter starts with a short summary of the article’s con-
tent, followed by the research article in its published format.
In the first article we aim to clarify the origins of characteris-
tics in human visual path integration behavior. We test human
linear and angular displacement estimation for varying underly-
ing sample distributions and find general magnitude estimation
behavior. This characteristic behavior is explained by an iterative
Bayesian estimation model that incorporates short-term prior ex-
perience into the current estimate of displacement.
The second article addresses the question whether humans are
also capable of incorporating abstract knowledge into their mag-
nitude estimate. A symbolic verbal cue is introduced to the path
integration paradigm containing additional information about
the stimulus. The significant change in behavior is modeled with
two iterative Bayesian estimation models. The models differ in
their generative assumptions of how the different information
sources (current sensory input, prior experience, and symbolic
verbal cue) are combined into a single estimate of displacement.
The discussion relates the findings in human path integration
to magnitude estimation in general. I will discuss the validity
of our assumptions and how our findings can provide a general
framework for modeling magnitude estimation.
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1 INTRODUCT ION
Man is not the measure of all things.
Protagoras (slightly modified)
The safe in the International Bureau for Weights and Measures
in Paris contains, protected by three bell jars, the International
Prototype Kilogram, the base unit of mass1. It is one of the
seven units of measure2 defined by the International System of
Units that determine the measurement of the physical quanti-
ties length, mass, time, electric current, temperature, luminous
intensity, and mole. One reason why we need artificial units
to measure these magnitudes is the discrepancy between phys-
ical magnitudes such as weight, luminance or distance and our
corresponding subjectively experienced heaviness, brightness or
displacement. The ringing of our cell phone, for example, is
drowned out by a crowd of chatting people, while it is alarm-
ingly loud when we are sitting in the audience of a lecture, al-
though its true loudness remains the same. Our subjective expe-
rience of magnitude is not veridical. This is why we use watches
to measure time, thermometers to measure temperature, scales
to measure weight, and so forth. But where does the discrep-
ancy come from?
To answer this question, one has to consider how information
about physical quantities is mapped onto our senses and how
the resulting sensation in turn leads to perception and behav-
ior. Multiple domains of research, including philosophy, neuro-
science, and psychology have focused on different aspects of this
process.
In this thesis, I present a framework that explains human behav-
1 The International Prototype Kilogram might soon be outdated. It was orig-
inally built as provisional mass standard that has almost exactly the mass
of one liter of water (water itself was inconvenient to use as a measure for
trading). Consequently, the International Prototype Kilogram is the only re-
maining base unit that is based on a metallic artifact rather than a fundamen-
tal physical property that is easily reproducible. Consequently the General
Conference on Weights and Measures agreed that the kilogram should be re-
defined based on fundamental constants in nature. The issue will be decided
on the next conference in 2014.
2 These units of measure are meter, kilogram, second, ampere, kelvin, candela,
and mole.
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ior in a specific type of magnitude estimation3, the estimation of
linear and angular displacements from self-motion cues, termed
path integration. The framework proposed is likely to provide a
general account of magnitude estimation, as the behavioral char-
acteristics explained are omnipresent across various domains, in-
cluding loudness estimation, brightness estimation, or time esti-
mation.
In the following, I will introduce three elements that are key to
the approach: The psychophysical laws that describe the funda-
mental mathematical relationship between the experienced in-
tensity of a magnitude and its physical size and therefore build
the starting point for a model of magnitude estimation. The
characteristic effects that demonstrate how the above relationship
is dependent on contextual influences and which will build the
motivation for a new extended modeling approach to magnitude
estimation. Finally, Bayesian inference that can provide a general
explanation for the characteristic effects and incorporate the psy-
chophysical laws.
1.1 the psychophysical laws
1.1.1 Weber-Fechner Law
From stimulus to subjective sensation. Envision science in the
early 19th century when physics was already a rather mature
science that used quantitative measures to relate phenomena in
nature via well-defined mathematical relationships, later consid-
ered as the laws of physics. The idea that unifying principles
in nature can be expressed in terms of mathematical relation-
ships must have been, and still is, quite appealing to other sci-
ences, including psychology. Thus, it does not come as a sur-
prise that Gustav Theodor Fechner in 1860 attempted to estab-
lish a natural-science-inspired branch of psychology, called psy-
chophysics. He was looking for a mathematical relationship be-
tween physical and psychological quantities, a psychophysical law.
In his Elements of Psychophysics, Fechner states that ’psychophysics
3 The term magnitude estimation in the context of classical psychophysics can
have different meanings. If not explicitly stated, I will always refer to mag-
nitude estimation as a general quantitative assessment of the relationship
between stimulus magnitude and corresponding experienced sensation or
perception independent of the particular response-method used (production-
reproduction, cross-modality matching, etc.). Magnitude estimation can, how-
ever, also refer to a very specific method in classical psychophysics introduced
by Stevens [1946, 1951], where subjects are asked to assign numbers in propor-
tion to the magnitude of a given stimulus.
1.1 the psychophysical laws 3
like physics should rest upon evidence and mathematical relations of
empirical facts [...]’ [Fechner, 1860]4. He found a mathematical
relationship between physical and psychological quantities in
the work of Ernst Heinrich Weber [1850] who was one of the
first to approach the study of the human response to a physical
stimulus in a quantitative fashion. Weber asked subjects to dis-
criminate between two stimulus magnitudes that differed only
by a slight increment in order to determine their subjective dis-
crimination threshold; a method that still is the gold standard to
measure sensitivity in psychophysics. Weber found that this just-
noticeable difference between two stimuli is approximately propor-
tional to the absolute stimulus magnitude. The relation becomes
intuitively accessible if we imagine lifting a weight of 10 g. If an-
other 5 g were added on top of this one, the difference would im-
mediately be noticeable. If, however, the first weight was 1 kg, a
5 g difference could not be detected anymore. The proportional
relationship between the just-noticeable stimulus difference ∆I
and the absolute stimulus magnitude I can be expressed by the
following equation, later known as Weber’s law,
∆I
I
= k (1.1)
where the constant factor k is referred to as the Weber fraction
and depends on the type of stimulus tested.
In his search for a law of psychophysics, Fechner had the idea
that Weber’s just-noticeable difference between physical stimuli
is proportional to a just-noticeable difference in subjective sensa-
tion5 ∆S:
∆S ∝ ∆I
I
(1.2)
He thereby assumed that the factor k is constant and indepen-
dent of the intensity I. Adding up just-noticeable differences
across all stimulus magnitudes I in a specific sensation, formally
achieved by an integration, yields Fechner’s generalized psy-
chophysical law: The psychophysical function that relates the
subjective sensation S of magnitude to the corresponding physi-
cal magnitude I follows a logarithmic relationship:
S = c · ln I
I0
(1.3)
Here, c and I0 are constants, the latter is often referred to as the
4 Translation by the author, original quote: ’Als exakte Lehre hat die Psychophysik
wie die Physik auf Erfahrung und mathematischer Verknüpfung erfahrungsmäßiger
Tatsachen [...] zu fußen’ [Fechner, 1860]
5 Here, subjective sensation corresponds to an ’intermediary between sensory input
and perception’ [Laming, 1999].
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Figure 1: Relationship between stimulus magnitude and subjective
sensation. a) Schematic plot of the logarithmic relationship
between stimulus magnitude and reported subjective sensa-
tion as proposed by the Weber-Fechner law. ∆I corresponds
to the just-noticeable difference. b) Schematic plot of the
power-law relationship proposed by Stevens for four differ-
ent perceptual continua (electric shock, heaviness, loudness,
and brightness). The exponent n is modality-dependent. All
plots are depicted on linear scales.
detection threshold of the respective stimulus magnitude. Equa-
tion 1.3, termed the Weber-Fechner law6, states that a linear in-
crease in stimulus magnitude causes a logarithmic increase in
subjective sensation intensity (see figure 1a).
1.1.2 Stevens’ Power-Law
Nearly one hundred years later, another psychophysicist, Stan-
ley Smith Stevens, refuted Fechner’s psychophysical law in his
article To honor Fechner and repeal his law [Stevens, 1961]. Stevens
suggested that a different fundamental relationship exists be-
tween subjective intensity of sensation and physical magnitude
of a stimulus, namely a power function [Stevens, 1957]. He ar-
gued that Fechner’s extension of Weber’s law was too general
and suggested that the subjective sensation is, in contrast to
Fechner’s original assumption, dependent on the Weber fraction
[Stevens, 1960b]:
∆S
S
∝ ∆I
I
(1.4)
6 Fechner himself referred to this relation as Weber’s law. But Weber was also not
the first one to discover a logarithmic relationship. For a detailed discussion
on this historical background please refer to Masin et al. [2009].
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Consequently, this leads to a power-law dependence between
subjective intensity of sensation and the physical magnitude of
a stimulus, Stevens’ power-law [Stevens, 1957]:
S = c · In (1.5)
Here, c refers to another constant and the exponent n depends
on the respective modality tested (figure 1b). Cases where the
fitted exponent is smaller than one (n < 1) are referred to as
compression. Here, compression means that the increase in sen-
sation intensity decreases with increasing stimulus magnitude
[Stevens, 1960b]. In other words, subjects become less sensitive
for larger stimulus magnitudes. A compression is observed for
most sensory modalities (examples for brightness and loudness
in figure 1b). For these modalities it is hard to distinguish be-
tween Stevens’ power-law and Weber-Fechner’s logarithmic law,
because the shape of a power function with exponent smaller
than one and the logarithmic function are hardly distinguish-
able. Stevens’ power-law, however, also covers rare cases where
the dependency between subjective sensation and stimulus is
linear (n = 1) or reversed (expansion, n > 1). In the latter case,
subjects become more sensitive with increasing stimulus magni-
tude. A vivid example of an expansion is the pain response to
an electric shock (figure 1b).
Stevens’ foray was based on numerous experiments across all
sensory modalities that tested magnitude estimation based on
the judgment of ratios [Aiba and Stevens, 1964; Stevens, 1966b,
1970; Stevens and Greenbaum, 1966; Stevens and Guirao, 1963,
1964; Stevens and Harris, 1962]. Subjects were, for instance,
asked to assign a number to the magnitude of the perceived
stimulus with respect to a previously experienced standard stim-
ulus (magnitude estimation7) or to match the magnitude of the per-
ceived stimulus with a magnitude in another modality, e.g. the
brightness of a light source with the loudness of a tone (cross-
modality matching). He found that psychophysical data acquired
with these methods are best fit by a power function.
1.1.3 Comparison
Both Stevens and Fechner believed there is an accessible in-
termediate stage that reflects the intensity of a sensation before
7 Here, magnitude estimation refers to the specific method introduced by
Stevens to measure the perceived intensity of a stimulus magnitude with a
numerical response (see also footnote 3).
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any higher cognitive processes take place [Laming, 1999]. More
specifically, they both suggested that there is a scale transfor-
mation from the physical stimulus magnitude to this subjective
sensation that can be determined via the response in a magni-
tude estimation task.
The important difference is that Stevens and Fechner had slightly
different conceptions of how the response in magnitude estima-
tion relates to the subjective sensation, that resulted in a log-
arithmic or a power-law. Fechner, on the one hand, assumed
that there is no direct behavioral measure of subjective sensa-
tion. Thus, he proposed to measure just-noticeable increments
in sensation. The sum of these increments then yields an indi-
rect measure of subjective sensation. Stevens, on the other hand,
believed that absolute magnitude estimation on a ratio scale al-
ready provides a direct measurement of subjective sensation8
[Stevens, 1960b]. The different conceptualizations and concomi-
tant methodological approaches make a direct comparison be-
tween the two psychophysical laws complicated [Laming, 1997].
It has been argued that one cannot discriminate between the
two ideas of Stevens and Fechner without additional knowledge
about the underlying mechanisms of magnitude estimation. Both
laws might in fact be valid, but simply reflect different oper-
ational levels in the process of magnitude estimation. If our
subjective sense of magnitude was logarithmic - including the
subjective sense of numbers - and a numerical response method
was used to determine our sensation intensity - as it is the case in
Stevens’ magnitude estimation and cross-modal matching - one
would still find a power-law dependence between the physical
magnitude and response of subjective sensation [MacKay, 1963]
(for a detailed discussion, see section 4.2).
In this thesis, I present a combined understanding of Stevens and
Weber-Fechner. By following up on these ideas it is proposed
that magnitude estimation is not a pure measurement of sensa-
tion. Instead, the response reflects a perceptual estimate that
involves different processing stages. These processing stages
capture the different scale transformations proposed by Fechner
and Stevens. The most striking evidence for such an estimation
process comes from the characteristic effects in magnitude esti-
mation, that will be reviewed in the following section.
8 Interestingly, Fechner somewhat anticipated Stevens approach when he noted
that ’[...] a real measure of sensation would demand that we are able to call a given
sensation twice, thrice or in general so-and-so many times as intense as another - but
who could say such a thing?’ (Translation by Michell [2006], addendum by the
author, original quote: ’[...] aber zum Maße der Empfindung gehörte, daß wir sagen
könnten, diese Empfindung ist doppelt, dreimal, überhaupt so und so vielmal so stark
als jene, und wer vermag dies bisher zu sagen.’ [Fechner, 1860]).
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Figure 2: Schematic overview of selected effects in human magnitude
estimation. a) Range effect: the slope of the relationship
between reported magnitude and stimulus magnitude de-
creases with increasing stimulus range, leading to different
power-law exponents dependent on the stimulus range. b)
Regression effect: reported magnitudes show a tendency to
be biased towards the center of the full range of stimulus
magnitudes. As a consequence, large magnitudes are under-
estimated and small ones are overestimated. c) Scalar vari-
ability: the standard deviation of reported magnitudes in-
creases linearly with the corresponding mean reported mag-
nitude. All axes are plotted on linear scales.
1.2 characteristic effects in magnitudeestimation
From subjective sensation to behavior. When Stevens and col-
leagues empirically showed that the power-law holds for more
than a dozen modalities (e.g. brightness, loudness, duration)
and different testing methods, they originally interpreted the
fitted exponents as an invariant measure of the rate of growth
between perceived and physical magnitudes for each particular
modality [Stevens, 1961, 1970]. This view was challenged when a
number of studies discovered that the fitted exponent in a given
modality is influenced by the observer, the history of stimuli
and the response method used [Poulton, 1968; Robinson, 1976;
Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian, 1971]. These determining fac-
tors were omnipresent across modalities and the variation in be-
havior associated with them became soon known as biases, or, as
I will refer to them, characteristic effects in magnitude estimation.
In the following, I will introduce the most common effects, the
range effect, the regression effect, subject-specific, experience-
dependent, and scalar variability.
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1.2.1 Range Effect
When magnitude estimation behavior was compared across
different experiments, one of the most striking findings was an
almost perfect correlation between the range of stimuli tested
and the reciprocal exponent of the power function for 24 differ-
ent test modalities [Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian, 1971]. In
figure 2a, this is depicted by a decreasing slope of the stimulus-
response relationship for stimulus ranges that contain larger mag-
nitudes [King, 1986]. As a consequence, Teghtsoonian and Teght-
soonian suggested that the exponent in Stevens’ power-law is not
a fixed entity but could reflect the subjective sensitivity range of
observers [Teghtsoonian, 1973; Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian,
1978]. An alternative interpretation would be that the exponent
in Stevens’ power-law does not contain any information about
the observers subjective sensation range, but purely reflects vari-
ability in the experimental stimulus range [Poulton, 1968].
1.2.2 Regression Effect
The regression effect, first termed the central tendency of judg-
ment [Hollingworth, 1910], can be observed within a single test
range. It describes the tendency of estimates of time, weight,
force, area, or size of angle ’to gravitate toward a mean magnitude’
[Hollingworth, 1910], resulting in a systematic underestimation
of magnitudes above the mean, an overestimation of magnitudes
below the mean and a correct estimation of the mean magni-
tude in the tested distribution (see figure 2b). The strength of
the regression varied for the same stimulus modality depend-
ing on the response methods used (e.g. using numbers instead
of brightness to match loudness) [Stevens, 1960b]. Stevens con-
sequently explained the regression effect by a tendency of the
subjects to compress the range of whichever ’variable’ they have
to adjust [Stevens, 1960a; Stevens and Greenbaum, 1966]. In
other words, the range of responses is smaller than the origi-
nal range of tested magnitudes. Stevens’ description, as well as
later attempts [Baird, 1997; Poulton, 1989] to categorize the re-
gression effect, provided, however, no mechanistic explanation
of why subjects would compress the stimulus range.
1.2.3 Subject-specific Variability
When the same subjects were tested in different modalities,
such as estimating weight, taste, and numbers, the fitted Stevens’
power-law exponent for each of these modalities was different.
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However, the same subjects that showed a large exponent in one
modality also showed larger exponents in the other modalities.
That is, the variation in the fitted exponents correlated for in-
dividual subjects. To account for this subject-dependent com-
ponent in the behavior, the authors proposed a modification of
Stevens’ power-law. They suggested adding a variable in the
power-law exponent that takes an individual value for each sub-
ject [Jones and Marcus, 1961]. A similar correlation in the fit-
ted power-law exponents for individual subjects was also found
for the estimation of circle size, numerousness, and line length.
Here, the authors simply ascribed their findings to the fact that
subjects might consistently use the same number scale across
modalities [Robinson, 1976; Rule, 1966]. Finally, Zwislocki sug-
gested a method to cancel out the subject-dependent component
to obtain unbiased Stevens’ power-law exponents. He divided the
fitted exponents obtained from one experiment (e.g. loudness)
by the exponent obtained from the estimation of line length for
each participant. The resulting reduction in inter-subject vari-
ability was interpreted as an indication that the original varia-
tion indeed stemmed from individual response characteristics
[Gescheider, 1988; Zwislocki, 1983].
1.2.4 Experience-dependent Variability
Responses of the same subjects were also significantly cor-
related across consecutive experimental sessions for the same
[Gescheider, 1988; Gescheider and Collins, 1989] as well as for
different test modalities [Ekman et al., 1968; Jones and Woskow,
1962]. The same holds true for responses on subsequent trials
[Cross, 1973; Garner, 1953]. Here, responses to stimuli that were
presented after a large stimulus tended to be larger, whereas re-
sponses to stimuli with a small preceding stimulus tended to
be smaller. This correlation was referred to as the sequential ef-
fect. This effect was suggested to be the basis of the stimulus
regression effect, as trials with very high stimulus magnitudes
are more likely preceded by a smaller stimulus magnitude in a
fixed test range and vice versa. Thus, estimates should show
a tendency to be biased towards the center of the full stimu-
lus range [Cross, 1973]. Both experience-dependent correlations
suggest that there might be a memory component in the behav-
ior as previous stimuli influence the estimation of the current
stimulus. There is also evidence that the session-to-session cor-
relations are only influenced by short-term experience, as they
are not persistent over long time scales [Teghtsoonian and Teght-
soonian, 1971].
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1.2.5 Scalar Variability
Finally, the variability of a repeated response to the same stim-
ulus is a function of the stimulus magnitude. As Weber noted,
responses of subjects became more variable with increasing stim-
ulus magnitude. This linear relationship between the standard
deviation and mean of a given reported magnitude was either re-
ferred to as a constant coefficient-of-variation, or as scalar variability
(see figure 2c) [Gibbon, 1977]9. There are several possible expla-
nations for this relationship: either subjects become increasingly
more noisy in their response to larger magnitudes (i.e. there is
a true scalar increase in variability), or magnitudes are repre-
sented on a logarithmic scale and this compression of the scale
for larger magnitudes causes the increase in variability [Cantlon
et al., 2009; Dehaene et al., 2008]. It is still unresolved which
of the two explanations is correct (for a detailed discussion, see
section 4.1.1).
1.2.6 Interpretation of the Effects
The discovery of the characteristic effects in magnitude esti-
mation across various sensory modalities challenged the inter-
pretation of the classical psychophysical laws.
On the one hand, Stevens and some of his colleagues adhered to
the statement that the power-law holds and that the exponents
are determined by the nature of the ’sensory tansducers’ of a given
modality [Stevens, 1960b]. Consequently, variations in the expo-
nent could be ’no more than the inevitable noise that characterizes
these complex processes’ [Stevens, 1960b, 1966a].
On the the other hand, one of his former students, Poulton
[1968], was one of the first to argue against this view. In a paper
that he originally attempted to entitle ’The New Pseudophysics’10,
he noted that ’there does not appear to be a stable relationship between
an observer’s use of numbers or similar measuring techniques and his
perception of physical magnitudes. Insofar as Stevens has given the
opposite impression in his published work, it has been by using trained
selected observers and restricted experimental conditions.’ [Poulton,
1968]. Poulton believed that the effects in magnitude estimation
are de facto properties of the process itself rather than artifacts
caused by individuals. Consequently, he proposed that ’central
9 Gibbon originally referred to this relationship as scalar variance. However, this
term was misleading and scalar variability established instead.
10 The editor of Psychological Bulletin refused to accept this title, so that the final
version was entitled ’The new psychophysics: six models for magnitude estimation’
[Poulton, 1981].
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processes involving judgment cannot be understood entirely in terms
of the behavior of the sense organs. The mechanisms of response learn-
ing and of response bias must be included in any adequate description.’
[Poulton, 1968]. Poulton heralded the start of a new understand-
ing of magnitude estimation that rejects pure sensation-driven
explanations in favor of higher perceptual processes. These pro-
cesses can only be understood if all of the characteristic effects
are considered.
The framework presented in this thesis ties in with Poultons
ideas. I suggest that the characteristics observed in magnitude
estimation yield an insight to its underlying processes. In par-
ticular, that the behavior is dependent on the experience, the
context, or the subject argues against a purely sensation-driven
understanding of magnitude estimation. Instead, it seems like
the behavior is also based on an incorporation of a-priori knowl-
edge in the broadest sense. This a-priori knowledge needs to be
combined with sensory information to yield an estimate of the
magnitude. Such a process can be described in a probabilistic
framework for perception that is rooted in Bayesian inference.
1.3 a bayesian approach to perception
1.3.1 Perception as Inference
From stimulus to perception. When Fechner started the study of
absolute thresholds and just-noticeable differences, he assumed
that if a sensation is sufficiently strong, then there is a transition
from an unconscious to a conscious mental state [Rouder and
Morey, 2009]. This view of the threshold as a discrete step func-
tion changed in the 1950’s. The insight came from a combination
of statistical decision theory [Grenander, 1950; Neyman and Pear-
son, 1933; Wald, 1939] and communication systems theory [Rice,
1944; Shannon, 1948]. Experiments in these fields proved that
individuals’ thresholds could vary to a large extent depending
on the level of background noise, the strength of the stimulus or
the subjective motivation. As a consequence, the detectability of
a signal was no longer viewed as a direct reflection of sensitiv-
ity, but rather as the result of a decision process. This decision
process is, on the one hand, corrupted by external and internal
noise and, on the other hand, influenced by the personal deci-
sion criterion, e.g. responding very accurately or very quickly.
Consequently, there is a smooth transition between stimuli that
can be detected and stimuli that cannot. Furthermore, instead of
an on-off switch there is a certain probability of detecting a sig-
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Figure 3: a) Combining prior and likelihood based on their reliabil-
ity (width of the distribution) according to Bayes theorem.
The prior represents the a-priori probability of a given state-
of-the-world. The likelihood represents the probability of
measuring the new observation (e.g. sensory input). The
posterior is the probability of the state-of-the-world given
the new observation. b) Example stimulus used to describe
the interaction between prior and sensory input. Depending
on the orientation the colored disc appears to be convex (up-
per row) or when flipped appears to be concave (lower row).
The interpretation is caused by an a-priori assumption that
light comes from above.
nal. The classical psychophysical methods, in contrast, did not
discern between the true sensitivity of subjects and the personal
decision criteria.
The first comprehensive mathematical analysis to explain how
stimuli are detected in the presence of background noise was
the signal detection theory [Green and Swets, 1966; Peterson et al.,
1954]. The principal concept is simple: If we have to discriminate
whether a signal is present or not in a noisy environment, and
we respond that we detected the signal, there will be a certain
rate of cases where this response is correct (when the signal was
present, hit rate) or incorrect (when we detected a signal that was
not present, false alarm rate). Signal detection theory states that
our sensitivity is given by the difference between the probability
of a hit and the probability of a false alarm. That way, signal de-
tection theory allowed for the measurement of sensitivity in the
presence of noise independent of the personal decision criterion.
Perception as unconscious inference. Uncertainty is present in
all perceptual processes. Consider for instance the perception of
color from reflected light. If our eyes received blue light reflected
from a wall, then it is either because the wall is painted blue or
it is white and illuminated by a blue light source. In most cases
we can tell the difference. Somehow our perceptual system must
have found a way to solve most of these ill-posed problems. One
extremely influential idea of how this could be achieved came
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from Hermann von Helmholtz. He proposed that perception is
more than a mere reflection of the sum of sensory inputs; it is
a process that constructs a hypothesis about what-the-world-is-
like based on our sensory inputs and our implicit assumptions.
By incorporating these implicit assumptions, the brain is capable
of drawing conclusions from the noisy and ambiguous observa-
tions of the world, a process that von Helmholtz termed uncon-
scious inference. [von Helmholtz, 1867, 1878; Warren and Warren,
1986; Westheimer, 2008].
Let us assume we would like to make an inference of a given
state-of-the-world X based on our sensory input Y. The simplest
version of an inference would be to use some kind of look-up
table where each sensation corresponds to a single state-of-the-
world. By observing sensation Y, we could, thus, immediately
determine the corresponding state X. Normally, a sensation does
not, however, correspond to a single, but to a number of possible
states X, of which some are more, and others less likely. There-
fore, we would need to take all possible states and their respec-
tive probability into account which results in a so-called condi-
tional probability of observing the sensory input Y, given state X:
P(Y|X). This is called the likelihood. To make an inference, we
could take the most probable value of this likelihood function,
its maximum, as our estimate of the state-of-the-world. This
strategy is, therefore, known as maximum likelihood estimation11
and is the simplest version of a statistical inference. There might
be cases where it is unfavorable to rely on the sensory input
alone. Consider our example with the blue wall: There are at
least two possible explanations for the same sensory input (the
wall appears blue, because it was painted blue or because blue
light is reflected on it).
This can be resolved by another strategy which not only con-
siders the likelihood of our observation, but also our a-priori
assumptions before we made that observation, otherwise called
our prior P(X) (e.g. ’I have seen this wall a hundred times and it was
always blue independent of the light.’). This is where Bayes’ theorem
becomes important; it states how our prior and the new obser-
vation of the world, in this case the sensory input, can be com-
bined in a statistically optimal manner to yield a so-called pos-
11 In the context of Bayes theory, the term maximum likelihood estimation is also
often referred to as a Bayesian estimate with a uniform prior distribution. A
prominent example in the literature is Ernst and Banks [2002].
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terior probability12 distribution P(X|Y) [Colombo and Series, 2012;
Doya et al., 2007]. That is:
P(X|Y) =
P(Y|X) · P(X)
P(Y)
(1.6)
where P(Y) represents the probability of the new observation.
The posterior probability is thus proportional to the product of
both, the likelihood and the prior (see figure 3a)13. Consequently,
one way to make an inference would now be to take the most
probable value of this posterior function as an estimate of the
state-of-the-world, which is called maximum a-posteriori estima-
tion.
But this strategy also has a drawback. It does not provide any
information about the shape of the posterior and thus about how
reliable our estimate is. Imagine for instance if the function was
very broad, various estimates would be almost equally likely. To
remedy this, we could make a Bayesian estimate that takes the un-
certainty of the posterior distribution14 into account [Doya et al.,
2007; Körding and Wolpert, 2004].
So far we have attempted to estimate a given state-of-the-world
at a given point in time. To maintain an optimal estimate over
time one would need a continuous update of belief. One version
of such an online Bayesian inference is the Kalman filter [Kalman,
1960]. Analogous to the above description, it combines a-priori
assumptions of the state-of-the world with the new incoming ev-
idence based on the respective uncertainty to yield an improved
a-posteriori measurement (measurement update). This posterior
will then be used to predict the prior of the future as well as its
uncertainty based on an assumption about the dynamics of the
12 Probability in the Bayesian sense may be distinguished from probability in the
classical (frequentist) view. Here, likelihood, prior, and posterior probability
are all subjective probabilities in that they describe a degree of belief rather than
the true probability of an event to occur. I can be sure that an event is going
to occur, that is my subjective probability is 100%, although its true probabil-
ity might be less than 50%. Bayesian inference is, therefore, sometimes also
circumscribed as belief update [Doya et al., 2007].
13 The Bayesian estimate takes the uncertainty of prior and likelihood into ac-
count. It can be regarded as an elegant, mathematical elaboration on von
Helmholtz’ view (for a detailed review on whether von Helmholtz was a true
Bayesian, see Westheimer [2008]). When the likelihood and prior are Gaussian
and their noise sources are statistically independent, the most likely posterior
estimate is given by the weighted sum of the most likely value of the prior and
the likelihood distribution (a special case used in this thesis). The respective
weights are thereby inverse proportional to the uncertainty (the variances) of
prior and likelihood.
14 It does so by using for instance the full posterior probability distribution as an
estimate of the state-of-the-world, or a cost function that minimizes a specific
type of error.
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world (time update) [Berniker and Körding, 2011]. Every update
of the measurement is thus followed by a time update, and vice
versa (see Welch and Bishop [2002] for a detailed mathematical
description of the Kalman filter).
1.3.2 Modeling Perception as Bayesian Inference
Using statistical inference to model perception. The previous sec-
tion focussed on how an observer would achieve an optimal sta-
tistical inference of the world based on the sensory measurement
and a-priori assumptions. Such an observer is called an ideal ob-
server. Ideal observers can now be used to evaluate the behavior
of real observers [Kersten and Mamassian, 2009].
In the case of Bayesian theories of perception and behavior, ideal
observers are applied as a metric of performance. The basic idea
is to use a simplified descriptive model of the relationship be-
tween the input and the state-of-the-world, called a generative
model. Consequently the ideal observer does not necessarily
show the best possible performance in a task, but one that is
best according to a respective generative model15. The perfor-
mance of a real observer can then be compared to the predicted
ideal performance for a specific generative model16 [Kersten and
Mamassian, 2009].
A popular application of Bayesian ideal observers is in the con-
text of ill-posed problems, where the nervous systems works
in the presence of uncertainty due to noise or ambiguity [Pog-
gio et al., 1985]. Examples are the perception of a 3D shape
from a 2D image, visual illusions that allow more than one in-
terpretation of the same image, or the combination of different
sensory modalities [Ernst and Banks, 2002; Kersten et al., 2004;
Knill and Richards, 1996; Landy et al., 1995; Maloney, 2002]. In
such situations, sensory information alone often cannot resolve
the ambiguity. However, if we assume additional information
sources, e.g. in the form of prior experience or context, the prob-
lem becomes tractable. The following example illuminates this,
consider figure 3b: The retinal illumination of the objects in the
upper row is the same if it was concave and light came from be-
15 Best or optimal does not mean free of errors. A Bayesian estimate, given a
cost function, reduces the overall uncertainty (see figure 3a). This does not,
however, mean that it can not cause local systematic errors.
16 Another possibility to use ideal observers is to use them as benchmark of what
can be maximally achieved in a task, given the full information provided in
an experiment. When the real performance deviates from that of the ideal
observer this is an indication for a suboptimal processing of the information
provided (for applications, see Barlow [1962]).
16 introduction
low or it was convex and light came from above (the opposite is
true for the lower row). However, we usually perceive the upper
row as convex and the lower row as concave. The behavior can
be explained by a generative model incorporating an a-priori as-
sumption that light comes from above [Mamassian et al., 2002].
1.3.3 Magnitude Estimation as Bayesian Inference
Modeling effects in magnitude estimation. Apart from the obvious
situations, where additional information is required to resolve
ambiguity, the question arises whether a-priori assumptions are
also incorporated in magnitude estimation. A few promising at-
tempts have been made to apply models of Bayesian inference to
behavior in human magnitude estimation. The great challenge is
that most magnitudes are experienced across a relatively broad
range. It thus seems likely that our expectations adapt to the nat-
ural continuum of the task (e.g. estimating a duration in seconds
or in hours) rather than being fundamentally biased towards a
single a-priori assumption (like ’light comes from above’). A model
of magnitude estimation would, therefore, need to account for
the adaptive nature of magnitude estimation, e.g. by an incor-
poration of a-priori assumptions in the form of changing prior
experience.
One of the first mathematical implementations of this idea was
proposed by Laming [1999]. He suggested a model that ex-
plained the regression effect in cross-modality matching by the
use of prior expectations for the current stimulus estimate [Lam-
ing, 1999]. These prior expectations were built based on magni-
tudes experienced in previous trails and then incorporated into
the estimate in an statistical optimal manner. Lamings approach,
although extremely promising, did not receive much attention17.
Only a few years later, Bayesian models were successfully ap-
plied to a range of perceptual data, including force estimation,
coincidence timing or motion perception [Körding et al., 2004;
Miyazaki, 2005; Weiss et al., 2002]. Jazayeri and Shadlen [2010]
tested time estimation for three different time ranges (short, in-
termediate, and long). They found that the behavior differed
substantially depending on the underlying sample range, ob-
serving the regression effect, the range effect and scalar vari-
ability (see section 1.2). They showed that a Bayesian observer
model that uses the mean of each underlying sample distribu-
17 To this day Lamings article has only been cited twice according the citation
database Scopus, including the article presented in chapter 2.
1.4 the case of human path integration 17
tion as prior expectation can account for these behavioral char-
acteristics.
Jazayeri and Shadlen’s work reveals two interesting facts. First,
characteristics in magnitude estimation behavior might be the
result of an incorporation of prior experience. Second, a Bayes
observer model can account for this behavior. What is missing,
however, is how a-priori knowledge is acquired during the ex-
periment, and whether the model can be generalized to other ef-
fects such as subject-dependent variability and trial-to-trial cor-
relations. In this thesis, it will be shown that these issues can
be solved by a Bayesian estimation model that includes the psy-
chophysical laws and an online learning of a-priori knowledge.
1.4 the case of human path integration
Path integration is the ability to estimate ones self-displacement
solely based on self-motion cues such as proprioception or vi-
sion. A simple example for a path integration task is a homing
experiment. Homing means, subjects are asked to return to their
original home position after experiencing a certain displacement
(e.g. by walking or turning blindfolded). Although these tasks
appear relatively simple, subjects make systematic errors in path
integration. That is, they systematically over- or underestimate
certain displacements. Originally, these errors were ascribed to
subjects’ poor navigational abilities. Diverse models were de-
veloped to explain the misestimation of displacements by an
accumulation of small errors in the integration of either space
or time, termed as leaky integration [Glasauer et al., 2007; Lappe
et al., 2011]. This leaky integration predicts behavior that is inde-
pendent of experience or context. This is, however, not the case.
Instead, if we directly compare two different studies on path in-
tegration then the same walked distance is estimated correctly
in one study [Klatzky et al., 1990] or underestimated by 2m in
the other [Schwartz, 1999]. The main difference between these
studies was the test range of stimuli.
Consequently, an alternative explanation for the systematic er-
rors exists; namely, that path integration is subject to the same
characteristic effects (the regression or range effect) as many
other types of magnitude estimation. If this is the case, then
a model that attempts to explain these effects in path integration
should provide a general account for the behavior in magnitude
estimation.
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1.5 aim of this thesis
As we have seen, magnitude estimation exhibits a number of
interesting features. On the one hand, there seems to be a fun-
damental mathematical relation between physical and perceived
magnitudes, that is captured by psychophysical laws. On the
other hand, this relation is strongly influenced by the context
and the individual experience, resulting in systematic behavioral
characteristics. These characteristic effects were at first not con-
sidered as fundamental features of magnitude estimation behav-
ior itself. In some cases, such as human path integration, they
are, therefore, still regarded as specific to the task at hand.
In this thesis, the focus is on these systematic behavioral char-
acteristics observed in human path integration. First of all, it
is investigated whether the systematic errors in path integration
can be characterized as effects of human magnitude estimation
behavior. If this is the case, a valid explanation for these char-
acteristics should be based on a framework that can capture not
only the behavior in path integration but generally in magni-
tude estimation. I propose that Bayesian inference is a promis-
ing candidate for such a framework. Evidence already exists
that characteristic effects in magnitude estimation can, similar
to effects in higher cognitive processes, be caused by an incor-
poration of a-priori assumptions. These assumptions are likely
learned from experience or based on other contextual informa-
tion sources. Bayesian inference could provide the mathematical
basis to combine these a-priori assumption with the sensory rep-
resentation of magnitudes.
The approach to these ideas was bipartite.
First, we assessed whether the systematic errors reported in hu-
man path integration can be understood as characteristic effects
in human magnitude estimation and whether the use of a-priori
knowledge can provide an explanation for this characteristic be-
havior. We therefore designed two studies on human path inte-
gration that aimed to change the a-priori assumptions of partici-
pants by either changing their immediate prior experience or by
providing them with additional abstract information on the stim-
ulus magnitude. The first study tested human visual linear and
angular displacement estimation in a production-reproduction
task for three different prior experience conditions by chang-
ing the underlying sample distributions. The second study in-
troduced an additional symbolic cue, containing information
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about the upcoming stimulus, to the distance estimation task
and tested how this additional information influenced path inte-
gration.
Second, a mathematical framework, based on Bayesian inference,
is provided to explain the observed characteristics (regression ef-
fect, range effect, individual variability). In particular, three dif-
ferent mechanistic Bayesian estimation models were developed
and tested. The models differ from previous accounts in that
they are (1) based on Fechner’s psychophysical law and in that
they are (2) capable of learning and incorporating prior experi-
ence as well as additional abstract information into the current
estimate of magnitude. This learning is modeled as a trial-by-
trial update by a Kalman filter. It allows a flexible adaption to
the present range of stimuli and accounts for sequential depen-
dencies in the behavior.
The two studies and the corresponding Bayesian estimation mod-
els are presented in two sections. The influence of prior ex-
perience on human path integration and the developed basic
Bayesian estimation model that explains the resulting regression
effect, range effect and other types of variability are described
in chapter 2. The influence of abstract contextual information
on human path integration and two different extensions to the
basic Bayesian estimation model that account for this context are
described in chapter 3.
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2 EXPER IENCE EXPLA INS RANGEAND REGRESS ION EFFECT
Experience is the name we give to
our mistakes.
Oscar Wilde.
2.1 summary
Experience matters. In the presented article, we tested the in-
fluence of changing prior experience on human visual path inte-
gration. We therefore tested human linear and angular displace-
ment estimation in a self-motion production-reproduction task
under three conditions (’short’, ’intermediate’, long’), that differ
in the choice of the respective underlying sample distributions.
We find that (1) subjects’ mean displacement estimation behavior
was biased towards the center of the underlying sample distri-
bution (regression effect), (2) the amount of bias increased with
increasingly higher sample ranges (range effect), and (3) the stan-
dard deviation for all conditions was linearly dependent on the
mean reproduced displacements (scalar variability).
An iterative Bayesian estimation model on logarithmic scales is
proposed that explains all observed behavioral characteristics by
the fusion of an experience-dependent prior expectation with
the current noisy displacement measurement. The iterative up-
date is modeled by the formulation of a discrete Kalman filter
and provides a model for sensorimotor learning without exter-
nal feedback. The model yields a direct link between Weber-
Fechner and Stevens’ power-law and should consequently prove
applicable to a wide range of magnitude estimation data.
2.2 reference
This work was carried out under the supervision of Stefan
Glasauer;
F.H.P. and S.G. designed research; F.H.P. and S.G. performed
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research; F.H.P. conducted the experiments; S.G. contributed un-
published analytic tools; F.H.P. analyzed data; F.H.P. and S.G.
wrote the paper.
The paper was published in The Journal of Neuroscience under
the following reference:
FH Petzschner and S Glasauer: Iterative Bayesian Estimation
as an Explanation for Range and Regression Effects: A Study on
Human Path Integration. The Journal of Neuroscience; 31(47):17220-
17229, 2011.
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Systematic errors in human path integration were previously associated with processing deficits in the integration of space and time. In
the present work, we hypothesized that these errors are de facto the result of a system that aims to optimize its performance by incorpo-
rating knowledge about prior experience into the current estimate of displacement. We tested human linear and angular displacement
estimation behavior in a production–reproduction task under three different prior experience conditions where samples were drawn
from different overlapping sample distributions. We found that (1) behavior was biased toward the center of the underlying sample
distribution, (2) the amount of bias increasedwith increasing sample range, and (3) the standard deviation for all conditionswas linearly
dependent on the mean reproduced displacements. We propose a model of Bayesian estimation on logarithmic scales that explains the
observed behavior by optimal fusion of an experience-dependent prior expectation with the current noisy displacement measurement.
The iterative update of prior experience is modeled by the formulation of a discrete Kalman filter. The model provides a direct link
between Weber–Fechner and Stevens’ power law, providing a mechanistic explanation for universal psychophysical effects in human
magnitude estimation such as the regression to the mean and the range effect.
Introduction
Path integration, that is, the ability to keep track of changes in
orientation and position using self-motion cues, constitutes an
essential component of spatial navigation (Mittelstaedt andMit-
telstaedt, 1980; Etienne and Jeffery, 2004). Yet human path inte-
gration performance exhibits systematic errors. Characteristic
overestimation and underestimation of traveled distances and
turning angles and thus a tendency to bias toward certain dis-
placements have been reported for path integration tasks in real
and virtual environments (Loomis et al., 1993; Ju¨rgens et al.,
1999; Riecke et al., 2002; Seemungal et al., 2007; Glasauer et al.,
2009b). Furthermore, systematic errors differ between studies:
while participants correctly reproduced a 10 m distance in one
study (Klatzky et al., 1990), they underestimated the same dis-
tance by 2 m in another one (Schwartz, 1999). The main differ-
ence between the two studies was the range of distances tested. In
the context of magnitude estimation, these systematic errors can
be interpreted as regression and range effects (Stevens andGreen-
baum, 1966; Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian, 1978).
One account of a bias in path integration posits processing
deficits that accumulate during integration over space or time
(Mittelstaedt and Glasauer, 1991; Fujita et al., 1993; Glasauer et
al., 2007; Lappe et al., 2007; Mossio et al., 2008; Bergmann et al.,
2011). However, research in related domains has shown that a
bias is not necessarily a result of deficient processing, but can also
represent the optimal solution of a system that incorporates prior
knowledge about the world to maximize its use of information
provided by sensory cues (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Burge et al.,
2008; Fetsch et al., 2009). A probabilistic interpretation of this
statement is the model of an optimal Bayesian estimator that
combines a current noisy measurement with an a priori estimate
that depends on previous experience (Ko¨rding et al., 2004; Mi-
yazaki et al., 2005; Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010) or reflects a gen-
eral intrinsic tendency (Ju¨rgens and Becker, 2006; Stocker and
Simoncelli, 2006).
Wehypothesize that such an estimation process could provide
a potential explanation for systematic biases in human path inte-
gration. In particular, we speculate that an experience-dependent
prior could cause the posterior estimate to adapt to the range of
stimuli presented and show a regression toward the expectancy
value of the underlying distribution. Thus, we tested human lin-
ear and angular displacement estimation separately in three dif-
ferent prior-experience conditions. In a virtual environment,
participants were asked to produce and subsequently reproduce
distances and turning angles that were drawn from three partially
overlapping sample ranges. If participants incorporated knowl-
edge about prior experience into their current estimate of dis-
placement, their behavior should depend significantly on the
underlying sample distribution. In a second step, we developed
and tested two variants of a Bayesian estimator model where the
reproduced displacement was determined by fusion of the cur-
rent measurement and an a priori expectation. The prior was
either modeled as a fixed value that approximated the statistical
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properties of the underlying sample distribution or as an iterative
estimate updated in each trial, which represented the immediate
prior experience.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Fourteen volunteers (seven female), aged 22–34 years, were monetarily
compensated for their participation in the study. All had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were naive to the purpose of the exper-
iments. The experiments were approved by the local ethics committee in
accordance with Declaration of Helsinki.
Experimental setup
Stimuli were presented binocular on a computer monitor (resolution,
1280 ! 800; frame rate, 59 Hz) driven by an ATI Mobility Radeon HD
3400 graphics card. Experiments were conducted in complete darkness
except for the illumination by the monitor. The real-time virtual reality
(VR) was created using Vizard 3.0 (Worldviz) and depicted an artificial
stone desert consisting of a textured ground plane, 200 scattered stones,
and a textured sky (Fig. 1a). The orientation of the ground plane texture,
the position of the stones, and the starting position of the participant
within the VRwere randomized in each trial to prevent participants from
using any of these as potential cues. The sky was simulated as a 3D dome
centered on the participant’s current position so that the distance to the
horizon was kept constant. The eye height in the VRwas adjusted individu-
ally to the true eye height of each participant (Daum and Hecht, 2009).
Participants used a multidirectional movable joystick (SPEEDLINK)
to navigate.
Experimental procedure
The estimation of traveled distances and the estimation of turning angles
were tested separately under three different conditions in a production–
reproduction task (Fig. 1a).
Distance estimation experiment. Each trial started with an instruction
for participants to move forward along a linear path while keeping track
of their self-displacement. Direction of movement during production
was indicated by a visual cue at the horizon. When participants reached
the sample distance dp, movement was automatically stopped and dis-
abled for a few seconds. Subsequently, participants were instructed to
reproduce the perceived distance and indicate their final position via
button press. In all trials, velocity was kept constant during movement,
but changed randomly up to"60% (scaling factor drawn from a normal
distribution) between production and reproduction phases to exclude
time estimation strategies to solve the task. To test the effect of prior
experience only, the settings for the three conditions were the same ex-
cept that the sample distances and respective turning angles were drawn
from three different underlying uniform sample distributions, specified
as small displacements (dp# [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] m), intermediate
displacements (dp # [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] m) and large dis-
placements range (dp # [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] m). The
sample distributions of the three conditions were chosen to be partially
overlapping to test whether displacement estimation behavior differed
significantly for the same sample stimulus depending on the previously
experienced displacements (Fig. 1b). Participants had no knowledge
about the amount of displacement they had to reach during the produc-
tion phase and were naive to the condition in which they were tested.
Turning angle estimation experiment. The stimulus and settings in the
angle estimation (AE) experiment were identical to the distance estima-
tion (DE) experiment, with the following exception: participants turned
on the spot to a previously indicated direction. Turning direction was
kept constant between production and reproduction to preclude the use
of external cues to solve the task. The sample turning angles, !p, for the
three prior experience conditions were in analogy drawn from three
different sample distributions specified as small displacements (!p# [10,
20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100]°), intermediate displacements (!p #
[50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140]°) and large displacements range
(!p# [90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180]°).
All participants performed both types of experiment. The three con-
ditions forDE andAEwere tested in separate sessions, resulting in six test
sessions per participant. Each session lasted between 45 and 60 min and
was composed of 200 trials. The first 20 training trials per experimental
condition served to familiarize participants with the VR. Feedback on the
performance was given after the reproduction by displaying an object in
the VR at the correct distance or turning angle and asking subjects to
navigate toward this location. In the following 180 test trials, no feedback
was given. Only test trials were used for data analysis. Two sessions of the
same experiment type, AE or DE, were separated by at least 1 h and up to
a few days. Within sessions, participants had a short break of 100 s after
100 and 150 trials. Each sample displacement was repeated 20 times per
condition in randomized order. The same trial order within one con-
dition was maintained for all participants. The order in which the
three conditions for DE and AE were tested was randomized for each
participant.
Analysis of behavioral data
Position and orientation of participants within the VR were sampled at
20 Hz. The displacement between the end of the production phase and
time of the button presswas calculated as the reproduced displacement dr
and !r. The estimation error was defined as the difference between the
reproduced and produced displacement. Data analysis was conducted in
MATLABR2010b (MathWorks). Statistical differences were assessed us-
ing repeated-measures ANOVA (rm-ANOVA). One rm-ANOVA with
Figure 1. The production–reproduction task.a, Temporal sequence of events in each test trial. Participants had to produce and subsequently reproduce a certain displacement in the VR by using
the joystick. Depending on the session, participantswalked on a linear path (DE) or turned on the spot (AE) until theywere automatically stopped after a certain displacement, dp or!p, respectively.
Next, participants were instructed to reproduce the same amount of perceived displacement while keeping the direction of movement constant. Participants indicated that they reached their final
position by a button press. This estimated displacement is referred to as dr in DE sessions and!r in AE sessions.b, DE andAEwere tested separately under three different conditions that differed only
in the underlying uniform sample distribution (small displacements, intermediate displacements, and large displacements range, for DE: turquoise, light blue, and dark blue, respectively; for AE:
bright green, olive, dark green, respectively) from which the production displacements dp and!pwere drawn.
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main factors for the overall condition (small displacements, intermediate
displacements, large displacements) and displacement ([1:10]¸ [5:14],
[10:19] for DE session and [10:100]¸ [50:140], [90:180] for AE sessions)
was performed on the signed estimation error to reveal differences in the
error magnitude and shape of the curve.
To assess range effects, we also looked for differences in reproduced
displacements of samples that were presented in more than one condi-
tion (i.e., overlapping samples) using a second rm-ANOVA referred to as
duplicated samples comparison with main factor condition (Higher
Range vs Lower Range). Thereby, overlapping samples were compared in
a single rm-ANOVA. For the factor Higher Range, we used [5:9] m from
the intermediate displacements condition and [10:14] m from the large
displacements condition, compared with the factor Lower Range includ-
ing [5:9] m from the smaller displacements condition and [10:14] from
the intermediate displacements condition.Note that eachmeasurementwas
only used once, either for the factor Higher Range or Lower Range. For
angular displacements, the factor Higher Range included [50:90]° from the
intermediate displacements condition and [100:140]° from the large dis-
placements condition; the Lower Range factor included [50:90]° from the
small displacements condition and [100:140]° from the intermediate dis-
placements condition. Linear regression analyses were performed to quan-
tify the relationship between mean and standard deviation. A probability
level of p$ 0.05 was considered significant for all statistical analysis.
Bayesian estimator model
The stimulus displacements for the production phase of the three condi-
tions were entered into a Bayesian estimator model in the same order as
in the experiment (Fig. 2). The model assumes Bayesian fusion of mea-
surement and prior experience on logarithmic scales to achieve a final
displacement estimate. The single computational steps are as follows.
Logarithmic internal representation of displacement. Weber–Fechner’s
law proposes the representation of a stimulus size on a logarithmic scale
(Fechner, 1860). Several recent psychophysical studies support the no-
tion that human behavior approximately follows this law for numerical
quantities (Dehaene et al., 2008), visual motion perception (Zanker,
1995; Ju¨rgens and Becker, 2006; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006), and lo-
comotor path integration (Durgin et al., 2009). Accordingly, we intro-
duced a modified logarithmic representation of perceived linear or
angular displacements, similar to the one previously proposed for mo-
tion perception (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006):
xm " ln!1 # dmd0" % nm, (1)
where dm is the measured displacement on linear scales and xm is the
internal noisy logarithmic representation of the measured displacement.
The random variable nm represents the normally distributed measure-
ment noise p(nm)&N(0, $m
2 ). The input stimuli are expressed in virtual
meters or degrees. d0$$ 1 is a small normalization constant, which leads
to a unitless internal representation of displacement. For the simulations,
we chose an arbitrary fixed value of d0# 0.01 m for distance estimation
and d0# 0.01° for angle estimation. The addition of 1 allows for repre-
senting a null displacement and may account for the deviation of the
Weber–Fechner law at small magnitudes.
Since all represented displacements (dm/d0) in our experiment are
large compared with 1, we reduced the general description of the trans-
formation in Equation 1 to the simpler form:
xm " ln!dmd0" # nm. (2)
Note that d always indicates displacements on linear scale, whereas x
refers to the mean of the internal distributions (Fig. 2a). Since the distri-
bution of the measurement noise is known, the measured displacement
can internally be represented by the likelihood distribution, a Gaussian
distribution with p(xm)& N(xm, $m
2 ).
Bayesian fusion of measurement and prior. The probability of having
experienced a certain displacement is given by the posterior probability
distribution, which depends on the likelihood of measurement or evi-
dence and the prior probability. Assuming that the likelihood functions
Figure 2. Two-stage Bayesian estimatormodel on logarithmic scales. a, Schematic estimation process. Stage 1, The produced displacement dp,i in trial i is represented by the Bayesian estimator
as a measurement likelihood on logarithmic scales p(xm,i). The posterior estimate of displacement is determined by the weighted average of the measurement xm,i and an a priori estimate of
displacement xˆprior,i'1,withweights ofmeasurementwmandpriorwprior, resulting after backtransform in a reproduceddisplacement on linear scales dr,i. Stage 2, The posterior estimate of the prior
in trial i, xˆprior,i, is estimated before the next trial according to theweighted average of the a priori estimate xˆprior,i'1 and themeasurement xm,i, with weights ki and 1' ki, modeled by the discrete
formulation of the Kalman filter, where ki refers to the Kalman gain. The posterior is updated over time to build the prior estimate xˆprior,i'1 in the subsequent trial. b, Example for the effect of the
Bayesian estimatormodel on linear scales for a particular sample interval. If the prior dprior is close to themean of the sample interval, Bayesian fusionwith themeasurement dm leads to a posterior
estimate dr that overestimates small displacements and underestimates large displacements. The effect is stronger for larger displacements (black arrows), due to the calculation of the weighted
average on logarithmic scales and thus an increased standard deviation with increasing mean on linear scales.
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of prior and measurement are approximately Gaussian, the mean of the
posterior distribution on logarithmic scales xˆr is, according to Bayes’
rule, given by a weighted sum of the mean of the prior distribution xprior
and the measurement likelihood xm.
xˆr" wprior ! xprior# wm ! xm (3)
with variance
$ˆr
2 "
$m
2 ! $prior
2
$m
2 # $prior
2 . (4)
Theweightswprior andwm add up to unity and depend on the uncertainty
of the measurement and prior, measured by the inverse variance of prior
and measurement distributions:
wm " 1 % wprior "
1/$m
2
1/$m
2 # 1/$prior
2 . (5)
In the proposedmodel, Bayesian fusion takes place on logarithmic scales
(Eqs. 1, 2), thus the reproduced distance on linear scales is determined
from the back-transformation of the Gaussian distribution p(xr)#N(xˆr,
$r
2), resulting in a lognormal distribution on linear scales.
Up to this point, the model specifies a posterior probability distribu-
tion of distances rather than the particular distance that should be repro-
duced. To determine the distance to be reproduced and thus to execute a
specific action the peak, the mean or any specific value of the posterior
distribution could be selected, depending on the cost associated with
making different types of errors (Doya et al., 2007). Commonly proposed
symmetric cost functions (Ko¨rding and Wolpert, 2004b) lead to repro-
duction of one of the location parameters mean, mode, or median of the
estimated posterior distribution.
However, in contrast to a normal distribution for the resulting lognor-
mal distribution, these location parameters are no longer equal. The
median d˜r, mean d!r, and mode dr max of the distribution are given by
d˜r " exˆr ! d0
dr " exˆr% $ˆr
2/ 2 ! d0
dr max " exˆr' $ˆr
2
! d0, (6)
and thus differ by a shift, which depends on the stimulus distance on
linear scales. The variance $d
r
2 is given by
$dr
2 " dr
2 ! (e$ˆr
2
% 1). (7)
To account for these differences in the reproduction estimate depending
on the cost function, we introduced a shift term, *x, as additional pa-
rameter in the modela (see Model fit), so that the reproduced displace-
ment is given as
dr " exˆr % *x ! d0. (8)
Note that with Equations 3 and 8, the reproduced displacement becomes
dr " e*x ! dˆpriorwprior ! dˆmwm, (9)
and thus follows Stevens’ power law (Stevens, 1961).
Finally, to account for signal-independent variability of the repro-
duced displacement caused, for example, by reaction times in handling
the response device, the random variable nc representing normally dis-
tributed constant noise p(nc) & N(0, $c
2) was added to the reproduced
displacement on linear scales dr.
Prior update. In the current study, the Bayesian estimator was tested
with two methods to implement an experience-dependent distance
prior, referred to as one-stage and two-stage model. In the one-stage
model, the prior was implemented as a distribution with a fixed mean
centered at themean of each underlying sample distribution and thereby
represented the global statistics of the input stimuli. In the two-stage
model, the displacement prior was updated iteratively in an additional
computation step dependent on the posterior estimate of the prior in the
previous trial and the current measurement of displacement (Fig. 2a).
The update in each measurement step is modeled by the discrete formu-
lation of the Kalman filter for a 1D first-order system. The state to be
estimated and the current measurement at update step i, corresponding
to trial i, are modeled by
xprior, i " xprior, i'1 # nq
(10)
xm, i " xprior, i # nr.
The random variables nq and nr represent the process and measurement
noise, respectively. They are assumed to be independent with approxi-
mately normal probability distributions p(nq)+N(0, q) and p(nr)+N(0,
r). The systemdefined by Equation 10 thus states that (1) the prior has no
intrinsic dynamics and is varying only due to random changes modeled
by nq, and (2) the current measurement is an instantiation of the current
prior perturbed by the measurement noise nr.
For this simple system, the difference equation system of the Kalman
filter reduces to
ki "
pi'1 # q
pi'1 # q # r
pi " ki ! r (11)
xˆprior, i " (1 % ki) ! xˆprior, i'1 # ki ! xm, i,
with ki being the Kalman gain, xˆprior,i'1 and xˆprior,i being the a priori and
a posteriori estimate of the distance prior at update step i, and pi and pi'1
the corresponding variance. Note that it is evident from this equation
that the Kalman gain ki can be interpreted as weight of the measurement
depending on measurement noise and the assumed random change of
the distance prior. The new estimate of the distance prior is thus a
weighted sum of the previous estimate and the current measurement.
In the context of the Bayesian estimator model, we refer to pi as the
estimated variance of the distance prior $prior
2 and r as the measurement
variance$m
2 . The prior for the two-stagemodel was initialized by the first
measurement and reset at the beginning of each new session to account
for the lack of prior knowledge of the underlying distribution except for
the training trials. Note that after a measurement has been taken, the
entire model is deterministic and does not involve any random elements
to determine the distance to be reproduced. A preliminary version of the
model has been published in abstract form (Glasauer et al., 2009a).
Model fit. The displacements used in the experiment were used in the
same order as input dm for both the one-stage and the two-stage models.
The shift term*xwas implemented in both models using Equation 8. In
the one-stagemodel, the single estimate of the prior xprior wasmodeled as
the log-transformed mean value of each underlying sample distribution
on linear scales. The weighting of priorwprior and*xwere determined by
minimizing the sum of the squares of the residuals of the one-stage
estimator model and the individual participants’ mean responses for all
three conditions simultaneously using the Matlab procedure lsqnonlin.
In the two-stage model, the prior xprior was modeled as a continuously
varying value determined by theKalman filter (Eq. 11), whichwas reset at
the beginning of each condition. To quantify the time course of the
Kalman gain ki, which approaches a steady-state value, its time constant
& expressed in trials was determined by fitting an exponential function to
ki. The ratio betweenmeasurement and process noise in theKalman filter
r/q and the shift term *x were determined by minimizing the sum of the
squares of the residuals of the two-stage estimator model and the indi-
vidual participants’ mean responses for all three conditions simultane-
ously using the Matlab procedure lsqnonlin. To be comparable to the
one-stage model, the steady-state weighting of the prior wprior, which is
aIf the displacement to be reproduced was estimated already on logarithmic scales, then the mode, mean, and
median of the posterior distribution would be equal and, for commonly used symmetric cost functions, the statisti-
cally optimal estimate would be themedian of the log-normal distribution. We tested for this possibility and found
that the model accounts well for the behavior of subjects when the shift parameter was not significantly different
from zero (see Results), but generated worse fits for the remaining participants.
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proportional to the ratio r/q, was determined from the result of the fitting
procedure and is reported in the Results, below.
Thus, both the one-stage and the two-stage models are each fully de-
termined by two free parameters. However, the one-stagemodel requires
additional input about the prior in each condition, whereas the two-stage
model does not. To assess the precision of the fitted parameters, we
estimated 95% confidence intervals (CI95%) of all parameters, which
were determined from the Jacobian of the parameter surface at the min-
imum using the Matlab procedure nlparci. The coefficient of determina-
tion R 2 was estimated to assess the proportion of variability in the mean
data that is accounted for by the respectivemodel. To test for a significant
difference in the R 2 for individual participants between the two models,
we used the Matlab procedure signtest.
For both models, the variance of the reproduced displacement $ˆr
2 was
determined separately from the slope of the linear regression between
standard deviation and mean of the reproduced displacements, using
Equation 7. The y-intercept of the regressionwas interpreted as being due
to constant noise p(nc)& N(0, $c) (see Bayesian fusion of measurement
and prior, above).
Predictions for Bayesian estimation. The proposed Bayesian framework
makes specific predictions on the behavior of an optimal estimator that
can be tested experimentally. First, assuming independent noise sources
for prior experience and measurement, the estimate on logarithmic
scales is determined by the weighted average of prior and measurement
dependent on the respective reliability. This leads to a power law depen-
dence between input stimulus and reproduced displacement (Eq. 9) in
linear space, as proposed by Stevens (1957), where the power function is
determined by the individual weighting of the subjects. Second, accord-
ing to this relationship, the difference between prior and measurement
and therefore the effect of the Bayesian fusion becomes more pro-
nounced for larger displacements, meaning that the overestimation and
underestimation increase for increasing displacements. This results in a
behavior known in the psychophysics literature as range effect (Teght-
soonian and Teghtsoonian, 1978). Third, assuming constant Gaussian
noise on logarithmic scales leads to a linear dependence of the mean
reproduced displacement and its corresponding standard deviation on
linear scales (Eq. 7).
Results
Experience-dependent behavior
Participants’ responses show three major characteristics that can
be attributed to an estimation process that incorporates knowl-
edge about the underlying sample distribution. These character-
istics were tested at the group and single-subject levels.
First, reproduced distances and turning angles exhibited a
clear tendency toward the mean of the underlying sample distri-
bution for each of the three sample distributions tested. In each
condition, small distances and angles were overestimated and
large distances and angles were underestimated (Fig. 3). This can
be seen in the overlapping distances ([5:14] m) and angles ([50:
140]°) that were tested in more than one condition for which the
duplicated samples comparison reveals a significant difference
between conditions (main effect: Higher Range, Lower Range;
DE: F(1,13) # 20.4, p $ 0.001; AE: F(1,13) # 66.6, p $ 0.001).
Furthermore, the duplicated samples comparison on the single-
subject level reveals that 11 of 14 participants in DE sessions and
all participants in AE sessions showed a significant dependence of
estimation magnitude on the underlying sample distribution
(main effect: Higher Range, Lower Range; DE: F(1,13) # 9.8–
202.0, p$ 0.01; AE: F(1,13)# 12.4–217.0, p$ 0.01).
Second, the bias toward the center for each sample distribu-
tion increased with increasing displacement range. The overesti-
mation and underestimation errors were more pronounced for
the conditions with larger displacements (interaction: condition!
displacement; DE: F(18,234)# 4.4, p$ 0.001; AE: F(18,234)# 3.2, p$
0.001). This causes a decrease in the slope between produced and
reproduced displacement for increasing sample range. The signifi-
cant change in the bias, measured by the change in estimation error
over the conditions, was found for 13 of 14 participants in DE and
AE sessions (interaction: condition! displacement; DE: F(18,234)#
4.7–38.3, p$ 0.05; AE: F(18,234)# 10.2–120.1, p$ 0.001).
Third, the standard deviation of the reproduced displace-
ments was dependent on the sample distribution. The duplicated
samples comparison revealed that standard deviations of over-
lapping samples differed significantly depending on the underly-
ing sample distribution (main effect: Higher Range, Lower
Range; DE: F(1,13)# 11.1, p# 0.005; AE: F(1,13)# 7.8 p# 0.01).
Additionally, we observed a strong correlation between themean
reproduced displacement and the corresponding mean standard
deviation for bothDE andAE sessions. (DE: linear regression: r#
0.95, p $ 0.001; AE: r # 0.97, p $ 0.001; Fig. 4a,c). On the
single-subject level, the linear regression between standard devi-
ation and mean of reproduced distances yielded a highly signifi-
cant correlation coefficient r for all participants (DE: p $ 0.001
for 11 of 14 participants, p$ 0.01 for the remaining three partic-
ipants, AE: p $ 0.001 for 11 of 14, p $ 0.01 for the remaining
three participants).
Test of the Bayesian estimator model
The experimental findings support the notion that humans in-
corporate knowledge about the stimulus properties applied in the
current condition into their measurement of displacement and
that this behavior is qualitatively in agreement with a Bayesian
estimation process.
To evaluate this finding in a quantitative manner, we fit two
variants of the Bayesian estimation model to the mean response
over all participants and to the individual participants’ mean
responses using a least-squares fitting method (Fig. 2a). The first
variant, referred to as one-stage model, tests a fixed prior (for a
similar study, see Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010), that is determined
by themean of each sample distribution and therefore represents
prior knowledge that captures the overall statistics of the experi-
ment (model fit group: wprior,DE # 0.40, CI95% # [0.33, 0.48];
*xDE # 0.03, CI95% # [0.01, 0.04]; wprior,AE # 0.40, CI95% #
[0.36, 0.43]; *xAE # 0.01, CI95% # [0, 0.01]; individual partici-
pants: w! prior,DE # 0.41 " 0.14, range # [0.20 ' 0.61]; *x!DE #
Figure 3. Mean displacement estimation behavior over all participants for the three prior
experience conditions (small displacements, intermediate displacements, and large displace-
ments range). a, Mean participants’ response in DE sessions in virtual meters (blues). b, Mean
participants’ response in AE sessions in degrees (greens). Error bars depict the standard devia-
tion between participants’ responses. The dotted line indicates were the response and sample
stimuluswould be equal. In both experiments, the behavior deviated significantly from the line
of equality depending on the prior experience condition. Small displacements were underesti-
mated and large displacements were overestimated in all conditions. The bias increased for
increasing sample range, being strongest for the large displacements range (dark colors). Small
displacements, intermediate displacements, and large displacements range, for DE: turquoise,
light blue, and dark blue, respectively; for AE: bright green, olive, dark green, respectively.
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0.02" 0.13;w! prior,AE# 0.39" 0.12, range# [0.14' 0.62];*x!AE#
0.01" 0.01). The shift parameter *xwas not significantly different
from zero for four of 14 participants in DE and three of 14
participants in AE sessions (remaining participants: DE: five
participants, $0; five participants, ,0; AE: five participants,
$0; six participants, ,0).
The second variant, or two-stage model, tests an iteratively
updated version of the prior that additionally accounts for vari-
ations during the time course of the experiment. This model has,
like the one-stage model, two free parameters (model fit group:
wprior,DE # 0.34, CI95% # [0.30, 0.58]; *xDE # 0.03, CI95% #
[0.01, 0.05]; wprior,AE# 0.33, CI95%# [0.28, 0.40]; *xAE# 0.02,
CI95% # [0, 0.04]; individual participants: w! prior,DE # 0.36 "
0.15, range # [0.20 ' 0.61]; *x!DE # 0.01 " 0.11; w! prior,AE #
0.32" 0.09, range# [0.14' 0.62]; *x!AE# 0.02" 0.07). The
shift parameter *x was not significantly different from zero
for six of 14 participants in DE and five of 14 participants in AE
sessions (remaining participants: DE: four participants, $0;
four participants, ,0; AE: three participants, $0; six partici-
pants, ,0).
The linear relationship between standard deviation andmean
of the experimental datawas deployed to derive an estimate of the
noise sources to simulate the predicted mean reproduction noise
of the model. The results for the two-stage model compared with
the behavioral data are depicted in Figure 4, b and d, for themean
of all participants.
Figure 5 compares the experimental data to the mean dis-
placement estimate by the two variants of the fitted Bayesian
estimator model. Both variants agree well with the experimental
data (coefficient-of-determination, one-stage model, model fit
group: RAE
2 # 0.98, RDE
2 # 0.97; individual participants: RAE
2 #
0.83 ' 0.99, RDE
2 # 0.84 ' 0.98; two-stage-model, model fit
group: RAE
2 # 0.98, RDE
2 # 0.97; individual participants: RAE
2 #
0.80 ' 0.99, RDE
2 # 0.88 ' 0.98). A non-
parametric comparison indicated no sig-
nificant difference between the R2 values
of individual participants for the one- and
two-stagemodels (p, 0.1). However, the
prior in the two-stage model arises due to
the online estimation of the Kalman filter
without any knowledge of the underlying
sample distribution, whereas the current
estimate of the prior in the one-stage
model was set to be the mean of the re-
spective underlying sample distribu-
tion. Therefore, the one-stage model
requires the incorporation of additional
knowledge compared with the two-stage
case. Furthermore, the two-stage model
with iterative update of the prior accounted
for small variations in the data that were
captured by the variations of the prior (Fig.
5, insets). Consequently, we considered the
two-stage model to be superior to the one-
stage model and used it for further analysis.
Figure 6c shows an example for a typi-
cal time course of the variable prior and
measurement in one session. The range of
displacements predicted by the prior esti-
mates is smaller than that of the sample
stimulus. This leads to a predicted mea-
surement that covers a smaller range of
displacements than the input stimuli. The
Figure 4. Mean predicted and actual reproduced displacement estimation and corre-
sponding mean standard deviation (std). a, Experimental DE data of mean participants’
responses for all three conditions (blue dots) and linear regression (dotted line). b, Two-
stage model prediction for DE data (triangles) and same regression (dotted line) as in a for
comparison with the experimental data. c, Experimental AE data of mean participants’
responses for all conditions (green dots) and linear regression (dotted line). d, Two-stage
model predictions for AE sessions and same regression line as in c for comparison with the
experimental data. Small displacements, intermediate displacements, and large displace-
ments range, for DE: turquoise, light blue, and dark blue, respectively; for AE: bright green,
olive, dark green, respectively.
Figure 5. Summary of predicted and actual displacement estimation behavior. a, d, Mean reproduced distances in DE (a, blue
dots) andAE (d, greendots) sessions for all conditions (small displacements, intermediate displacements, and large displacements
range, for DE: turquoise, light blue, and dark blue, respectively; for AE: bright green, olive, dark green, respectively). b, e, Corre-
sponding prediction of the fitted two-stage model (upward gray triangles). c, f, Corresponding prediction of the fitted one-stage
model (downward gray triangles). The dotted lines in all plots indicatewere reproduced estimate and sample displacementwould
be equal. Insets show small variations in the participants’ responses that are captured by the two-stage model with varying prior
but not by the one-stage model with fixed prior.
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time constant of the evolution of Kalman
gain varied between subjects (DE: &DE #
[0.2 ' 1.6] trials, AE: &AE # [0.3 ' 2.1]
trials). These values are similar to the time
constants reported for the learning of
pointing movements (van Beers, 2009)
and shown for learning the mean of a
prior distribution in a virtual coin-
catching task (Berniker et al., 2010, their
Fig. 6).
Predictions on single-subject behavior
Figure 6 compares the model predictions
of mean and standard deviation to the in-
dividual participant’s responses. The
model captures individual differences be-
tween participants mainly by variation in
the weighting of prior and measurement
that in turn determine the slope of the
predicted response curve. A strong
weighting of the prior results in a more
pronounced overestimation and underes-
timation, while a strong weighting of the
measurement results in a predicted re-
sponse that is very similar to the input
stimuli (Fig. 6a,b, line of equality). Thus,
the weighting reflects a scale invariant
measure of the overall behavioral ten-
dency of subjects in one experiment.
Within participants, behavior was com-
pared by weighting the priorwprior between
the DE and AE experiments for each indi-
vidual participant. We found a significant
correlation between the weight in DE com-
pared with AE sessions (linear regression:
r# 0.76, p# 0.001). Figure 7 shows that the
weighting of the prior within participants
and betweenDE and AE conditions wasmore similar than between
participants. In particular, the mean ratio of the AE versus DE
weights was approximately equal (wprior,AE/wprior,DE# 0.90).
Discussion
Human linear and angular displacement estimation is influenced
by prior experience.We found that (1) reproduced distances and
turning angles were biased toward the center of the underlying
sample distribution, (2) the amount of bias increased with in-
creasing sample range, and (3) the standard deviation for all con-
ditions was linearly dependent on the mean reproduced
displacement. These three characteristics are well captured by a
model of an iterative Bayesian estimator that combines an
experience-dependent a priori expectation with the actual noisy
measurement to achieve an optimal estimate of displacement.
We propose that our results are not limited to displacement esti-
mation, but potentially hold for magnitude reproduction in
general.
Behavioral findings in the context of the literature
Previous work on human linear and angular displacement percep-
tion found similar results to ours with a tendency to overshoot and
undershoot certain displacements (Loomis et al., 1993; Ivanenko
et al., 1997; Seemungal et al., 2007; Bergmann et al., 2011). An indi-
cation for the influenceofprior experiencecanbe found inwork that
shows that distance estimation and error magnitude vary consider-
ably as a function of changes in the environmental experience
(Ziemer et al., 2009) or stimulus range (Teghtsoonian and Teght-
soonian, 1978; Klatzky et al., 1990; Schwartz, 1999). Yet the estima-
tion of distances and turning angles was mostly tested in different
studies, because a direct comparison of the two different measures
for single participants is difficult. In the present work, however, the
model provides a chance to compare the twomagnitudes in termsof
individual weighting of prior and measurement, which is invariant
to themeasure of themagnitude.We found that, overall, individual
participants seem to weight the prior for distances and turning an-
gles similarly, whereas the differences between participants’ weight-
ing were higher. One possible reason for this is that there is a
common processingmechanism formagnitudes in general, includ-
ing the estimation of turning angles and distances as proposed by
Walsh (2003). Another possible explanation is that the reliability of
the input was very similar because both measures were based on
optic flow in the same virtual environment (Frenz and Lappe, 2005;
Mossio et al., 2008). However, the degree of reliance on prior infor-
mation across tasks may also be a general trait that varies among
individual subjects.
Experience-dependent Bayesian inference leads to a
regression toward the mean
The regression effect, first referred to as the central tendency of
judgment (Hollingworth, 1910), in psychophysical magnitude
estimation is the tendency to correctly estimate magnitudes close
to the center of the stimulus range and misestimate marginal
Figure6. Comparison of individual participants’ responseswith predicted behavior of the two-stagemodel.a,Mean responses
of three selected participants in DE sessions and model predictions (gray triangles, wprior,Participant1# 0.39, wprior,Participant2#
0.39, wprior,Participant3# 0.40). b, Mean responses of the same participants in AE sessions and model predictions (gray triangles,
wprior,Participant1 # 0.15, wprior,Participant2 # 0.36, wprior,Participant3 # 0.38). c, Example of a typical time course for the same
participants of sample displacements (black line), reproduced displacements (light blue line), and predicted displacements (gray
line)within 30 trials of oneDE session (small displacements range, trials: 50–80). Dotted lines indicate the range of displacements
covered by the prediction of themodel. Small displacements, intermediate displacements, and large displacements range, for DE:
turquoise, light blue, and dark blue, respectively; for AE: bright green, olive, dark green, respectively.
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ones: values presented at the lower end of the range are overesti-
mated while those at the upper end show underestimation (Ste-
vens and Greenbaum, 1966; Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian,
1978). Stevens (1971) attempted to explain this behavior as the
tendency of the observer “to shorten the range of whichever vari-
able he controls.” A potential explanation for this tendency is
Bayesian fusion of measurement and a priori expectation (Lam-
ing, 1999), as shown for displacement estimation in the present
work. By multiplying the prior and the likelihood distributions,
which correspond to a weighted average of prior and measure-
ment in the Gaussian case, the estimate exhibits a shift from the
measurement toward the a priori expectation. As shown in Figure
6c, an experience-dependent posterior estimate of randomly pre-
sented stimuli covers a smaller range, with displacements close to
the center beingmore likely to occur; this consequently results in
a regression toward the center of the sample range.
Dynamic prior knowledge adapts to the range of stimuli
presented
Several studies have convincingly demonstrated that humans can
use near-optimal strategies to combine stimulus uncertainty and
prior information (Mamassian and Landy, 1998; Ko¨rding and
Wolpert, 2004a; Tassinari et al., 2006). The a priori expectation in
Bayesian models is often viewed as a fixed internal tendency that
is due to general features in the world, e.g., that slow velocities are
more likely to occur than fast ones (Weiss et al., 2002; Stocker and
Simoncelli, 2006). Several studies, however, have shown that the
a priori estimate can be modulated by short-term experience
(Adams et al., 2004; Ko¨rding et al., 2004; Miyazaki et al., 2005)
and its mean and variance could be learned during the experi-
ment (Guo et al., 2004; Ko¨rding andWolpert, 2004a; Berniker et
al., 2010). Jazayeri and Shadlen (2010), for instance, assumed an
experience-dependent prior expectation that was modeled as a
continuous and fixed distribution, centered around the mean of
the sample distribution. Indeed, it makes more sense for such a
representation to arise over time. In the present work, we tested
the fixed prior against a variable version that continuously up-
dates its expectation with the previous measurement. The as-
sumption behind the proposed updating procedure is that the
mean of the stimulus distribution changes slowly over time, but
in a way unknown to the system. We show that such an iterative
updated prior, modeled by a Kalman filter, accounts for small
variations in the data that are most likely due to the order of
stimuli presented and cannot be explained by a versionwith fixed
prior. Furthermore, this model provides an explanation for the
origin and development of such a prior over time. In particular,
the adaption to the underlying sample range for randomly pre-
sented stimuli (Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian, 1978; Kowal,
1993; Cheng et al., 2010) and also, potentially, the hysteresis ef-
fect, which refers to a dependence of the behavior on the order of
stimuli, for experiments with nonrandom order (Eisler and Ot-
tander, 1963; Hock et al., 2005) can result from the continuous
update of a prior according to the experienced displacements.
Logarithmic Bayesian fusion leads to a direct link between
Weber–Fechner and Stevens’ power law
In the present work, we suggest that the most parsimonious ex-
planation for the behavior is that displacement is coded internally
on a logarithmic scale, as first proposed by Fechner (1860) based
on Weber’s law, which has shown to hold for human locomotor
distance reproduction (Durgin et al., 2009). Similar results could,
in principle, also be achieved on linear scales, assuming scalar
variability, that is, a rise in the standard deviation with increasing
mean (Rakitin et al., 1998; Cantlon et al., 2009). Recent work,
however, supports the idea that numerical quantities (Dehaene,
2003; Nieder and Merten, 2007) and visual motion perception
(Ju¨rgens and Becker, 2006; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006) are
coded logarithmically in the brain. Note that latter authors as-
sumed that Bayesian integration still takes place in linear space.
However, as we have shown here, the power law, or Stevens’ law,
is a direct consequence of Bayesian integration on a logarithmic
scale (Eqs. 2, 3, 9). Thus, asMacKay (1963) has shown before, the
Weber–Fechner law and Stevens’ law are indeed compatible. The
proposed Bayesian fusion also assumes that the variance of a
measured magnitude is independent of the magnitude on the
logarithmic scale. On linear scales, this leads to a constant in-
crease in standard deviation with increasingmean, as observed in
the experimental data and corresponding to scale invariance
found in both Weber–Fechner’s and Stevens’ laws (Chater and
Brown, 1999).
Bayesian estimation of displacement, velocity, and time
Bayesianmodels succeeded in describing a variety of psychophys-
ical data in related domains. The experimental design in the pres-
ent study was very similar to recent work on interval timing
(Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010), allowing for a direct comparison of
the behavioral findings. In particular, the same characteristic fea-
tures, such as a tendency to the mean of the sample interval and
an increase in bias with increasing sample range for estimation of
traveled distances and turning angles, were previously reported
for interval timing. Jazayeri and Shadlen (2010) tested different
probabilistic approaches to combine the two sources of informa-
tion given by sensory input and prior experience and concluded
that a Bayesian observer model is statistically superior to maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (Ernst and Banks, 2002) or maxi-
mum a posteriori estimation in describing the main features of
the behavioral data.
A large range of phenomena in motion perception, such as
misestimation of speed and direction, was also successfully de-
scribed by a Bayesian estimation process based on a prior that
favors low speeds (Weiss et al., 2002; Stocker and Simoncelli,
2006). In line with this work, the variability in angular displace-
ment perception has been proposed to be a result of Bayesian
Figure 7. Comparison of the weighting of the prior within participants. Each dot represents
the weight wprior in AE and DE sessions for one participant. The gray dotted line indicates the
linear regression between the two weights and the black dotted line is the line of equality.
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fusion of sensory inputs (Butler et al., 2010) and cognitive move-
ment velocity (Ju¨rgens and Becker, 2006). In the present work,
however, movement velocity was varied randomly and indepen-
dently of the experience condition. Thus, we show that the
observed effects between conditions de facto depend on the ex-
perienced distances or turning angles. Yet the measurement of
these displacements in the virtual world is still determined by an
integration of optic flow, raising the question of whether the
Bayesian estimation process is based on an estimate of displace-
ment or takes place for time and velocity separately and is fused
on a higher cognitive level to represent an estimate of displace-
ment. The computational costs of the latter case would be higher
for updating more than one magnitude and update of displace-
ments alone in the present work provides a parsimonious expla-
nation for a large number of findings.
Conclusion
From the realization of the iterative Bayesian estimatormodel, we
infer that the systematic errors seen in human path integration
behavior are the result of a performance-optimizing estimation
process that exploits knowledge about previous behavior and the
uncertainty of measurements. The model provides a direct link
betweenWeber–Fechner and Stevens’ power law. Consequently,
we propose that our results are not limited to displacement esti-
mation, but can potentially provide a unified explanation for
commonly seen effects in psychophysical magnitude estimation
studies, such as the range, regression effect, and hysteresis effect.
References
Adams WJ, Graf EW, Ernst MO (2004) Experience can change the ‘light-
from-above’ prior. Nat Neurosci 7:1057–1058.
Bergmann J, Krauss E, Mu¨nch A, Jungmann R, Oberfeld D, Hecht H (2011)
Locomotor and verbal distance judgments in action and vista space. Exp
Brain Res 210:13–23.
Berniker M, Voss M, Ko¨rding K (2010) Learning priors for Bayesian com-
putations in the nervous system. PLoS One 5:e12686.
Burge J, Ernst MO, Banks MS (2008) The statistical determinants of adap-
tation rate in human reaching. J Vis 8:20.1–20.19.
Butler JS, Smith ST, Campos JL, Bu¨lthoffHH (2010) Bayesian integration of
visual and vestibular signals for heading. J Vis 10:23.
Cantlon JF, Cordes S, LibertusME, Brannon EM (2009) Comment on “Log
or linear? Distinct intuitions of the number scale inWestern and Amazo-
nian indigene cultures”. Science 323:38; author reply 38.
Chater N, Brown GD (1999) Scale-invariance as a unifying psychological
principle. Cognition 69:B17–B24.
Cheng K, SpetchML, Hoan A (2010) Categories and range effects in human
spatial memory. Front Psychol 1:231.
DaumSO,HechtH (2009) Distance estimation in vista space. Atten Percept
Psychophys 71:1127–1137.
Dehaene S (2003) The neural basis of theWeber–Fechner law: a logarithmic
mental number line. Trends Cogn Sci 7:145–147.
Dehaene S, IzardV, Spelke E, Pica P (2008) Log or linear?Distinct intuitions
of the number scale inWestern andAmazonian indigene cultures. Science
320:1217–1220.
Doya K, Ishi S, Pouget A, Rao RPN (2007) Bayesian brain-probabilistic ap-
proaches to neural coding. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
Durgin FH, Akagi M, Gallistel CR, HaikenW (2009) The precision of loco-
motor odometry in humans. Exp Brain Res 193:429–436.
Eisler H, Ottander C (1963) On the problem of hysteresis in psychophysics.
J Exp Psychol 65:530–536.
Ernst MO, Banks MS (2002) Humans integrate visual and haptic informa-
tion in a statistically optimal fashion. Nature 415:429–433.
Etienne AS, Jeffery KJ (2004) Path integration in mammals. Hippocampus
14:180–192.
Fechner GT (1860) Elemente der Psychophysik. Leipzig: Breitkopf and
Ha¨rtel.
Fetsch CR, Turner AH, DeAngelis GC, Angelaki DE (2009) Dynamic re-
weighting of visual and vestibular cues during self-motion perception.
J Neurosci 29:15601–15612.
Frenz H, Lappe M (2005) Absolute travel distance from optic flow. Vision
Res 45:1679–1692.
Fujita N, Klatzky RL, Loomis JM, Golledge RG (1993) The encoding-
error model of pathway completion without vision. Geograph Anal
25:295–314.
Glasauer S, Schneider E,GrassoR, IvanenkoYP (2007) Space-time relativity
in self-motion reproduction. J Neurophysiol 97:451–461.
Glasauer S, Jahn K, Stein A, Brandt T (2009a) On the origin of systematic
errors in a simple navigation task. BMC Neurosci 10[Suppl 1]:P13.
Glasauer S, SteinA,Gu¨ntherAL, FlanaginVL, JahnK, Brandt T (2009b) The
effect of dual tasks in locomotor path integration. Ann N Y Acad Sci
1164:201–205.
Guo K, Nevado A, Robertson RG, Pulgarin M, Thiele A, Young MP (2004)
Effects on orientation perception of manipulating the spatio-temporal
prior probability of stimuli. Vision Res 44:2349–2358.
Hock HS, Bukowski L, Nichols DF, Huisman A, Rivera M (2005) Dynami-
cal vs. judgmental comparison: hysteresis effects in motion perception.
Spat Vis 18:317–335.
Hollingworth HL (1910) The central tendency of judgment. J Philos Psych
Sci Meth 7:461–469.
Ivanenko Y, Grasso R, Israe¨l I, Berthoz A (1997) Spatial orientation in hu-
mans: perception of angular whole-body displacements in two-
dimensional trajectories. Exp Brain Res 117:419–427.
Jazayeri M, Shadlen MN (2010) Temporal context calibrates interval tim-
ing. Nat Neurosci 13:1020–1026.
Ju¨rgens R, Becker W (2006) Perception of angular displacement without
landmarks: evidence for Bayesian fusion of vestibular, optokinetic,
podokinesthetic, and cognitive information. Exp Brain Res
174:528–543.
Ju¨rgens R, Boss T, Becker W (1999) Estimation of self-turning in the dark:
comparison between active and passive rotation. Exp Brain Res 128:
491–504.
Klatzky RL, Loomis JM, Golledge RG, Cicinelli JG, Doherty S, Pellegrino JW
(1990) Acquisition of route and survey knowledge in the absence of vi-
sion. J Mot Behav 22:19–43.
Knill DC, Pouget A (2004) The Bayesian brain: the role of uncertainty in
neural coding and computation. Trends Neurosci 27:712–719.
Ko¨rding KP, Wolpert DM (2004a) Bayesian integration in sensorimotor
learning. Nature 427:244–247.
Ko¨rding KP,Wolpert DM (2004b) The loss function of sensorimotor learn-
ing. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 101:9839–9842.
Ko¨rding KP, Ku SP, Wolpert DM (2004) Bayesian integration in force esti-
mation. J Neurophysiol 92:3161–3165.
Kowal KH (1993) The range effect as a function of stimulus set, presence of
a standard, and modulus. Percept Psychophys 54:555–561.
Laming D (1999) Prior expectations in cross-modality matching. Math So-
cial Sciences 38:343–359.
Lappe M, Jenkin M, Harris LR (2007) Travel distance estimation from vi-
sual motion by leaky path integration. Exp Brain Res 180:35–48.
Loomis JM, Klatzky RL, Golledge RG, Cicinelli JG, Pellegrino JW, Fry PA
(1993) Nonvisual navigation by blind and sighted: assessment of path
integration ability. J Exp Psychol Gen 122:73–91.
MacKay DM (1963) Psychophysics of perceived intensity: a theoretical basis
for Fechner’s and Stevens’ laws. Science 139:1213–1216.
Mamassian P, LandyMS (1998) Observer biases in the 3D interpretation of
line drawings. Vision Res 38:2817–2832.
Mittelstaedt ML, Glasauer S (1991) Idiothetic navigation in gerbils and hu-
mans. Zool Jahrb Abt Physiol 427–435.
Mittelstaedt ML, Mittelstaedt H (1980) Homing by path integration in a
mammal. Naturwissenschaften 67:566–567.
Miyazaki M, Nozaki D, Nakajima Y (2005) Testing Bayesian models of hu-
man coincidence timing. J Neurophysiol 94:395–399.
Mossio M, Vidal M, Berthoz A (2008) Traveled distances: new insights into
the role of optic flow. Vision Res 48:289–303.
Nieder A, Merten K (2007) A labeled-line code for small and large numer-
osities in the monkey prefrontal cortex. J Neurosci 27:5986–5993.
Rakitin BC, Gibbon J, Penney TB,Malapani C,Hinton SC,MeckWH (1998)
Scalar expectancy theory and peak-interval timing in humans. J Exp Psy-
chol Anim Behav Process 24:15–33.
Riecke BE, VeenHAHCv, Bu¨lthoff HH (2002) Visual homing is possible with-
out landmarks: a path integration study in virtual reality. Presence 11:443–473.
17228 • J. Neurosci., November 23, 2011 • 31(47):17220–17229 Petzschner and Glasauer • Bayesian Fusion Explains Range and Regression Effect
Schwartz M (1999) Haptic perception of the distance walked when blind-
folded. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 25:852–865.
Seemungal BM, Glasauer S, Gresty MA, Bronstein AM (2007) Vestibular
perception and navigation in the congenitally blind. J Neurophysiol
97:4341–4356.
Stevens SS (1957) On the psychophysical law. Psychol Rev 64:153–181.
Stevens SS (1961) To honor Fechner and repeal his law: a power function,
not a log function, describes the operating characteristic of a sensory
system. Science 133:80–86.
Stevens SS (1971) Issues in psychophysical measurement. Psychol Rev
78:426–450.
Stevens SS, Greenbaum H (1966) Regression effect in psychophysical judg-
ment. Atten Percept Psychophys 1:439–446.
Stocker AA, Simoncelli EP (2006) Noise characteristics and prior expec-
tations in human visual speed perception. Nat Neurosci 9:578–585.
Tassinari H, Hudson TE, Landy MS (2006) Combining priors and noisy
visual cues in a rapid pointing task. J Neurosci 26:10154–10163.
Teghtsoonian R, Teghtsoonian M (1978) Range and regression effects in
magnitude scaling. Percept Psychophys 24:305–314.
van Beers RJ (2009) Motor learning is optimally tuned to the properties of
motor noise. Neuron 63:406–417.
Walsh V (2003) A theory of magnitude: common cortical metrics of time,
space and quantity. Trends Cogn Sci 7:483–488.
Weiss Y, Simoncelli EP, Adelson EH (2002) Motion illusions as optimal
percepts. Nat Neurosci 5:598–604.
Zanker JM (1995) Does motion perception followWeber’s law? Perception
24:363–372.
Ziemer CJ, Plumert JM, Cremer JF, Kearney JK (2009) Estimating distance
in real and virtual environments: does order make a difference? Atten
Percept Psychophys 71:1095–1106.
Petzschner and Glasauer • Bayesian Fusion Explains Range and Regression Effect J. Neurosci., November 23, 2011 • 31(47):17220–17229 • 17229
3 INCORPORAT ION OF ABSTRACTA -PR IOR I ASSUMPT IONS
Priority is a function of context.
Stephen R. Covey
3.1 summary
Context matters. The second investigation aims to clarify (1)
whether humans are also capable of incorporating other more
abstract types of a-priori knowledge, apart from prior experi-
ence, and (2) if this behavior can also be explained by a Bayesian
framework.
We therefore adjusted the production-reproduction task for lin-
ear displacements to test three different experimental conditions.
In the first condition test displacements were quasi-randomly
drawn from a range of short displacements for the first half of
the trials and from a range of larger displacements for the sec-
ond half of the trials. As in the previous study both ranges
were overlapping and the influence of immediate prior experi-
ence should cause estimates that are shifted towards the center
of the respective sample range. In the second condition the exact
same displacements were tested but in a fully randomized order,
resulting in a single non-uniform sample range. In this case, we
expected no separation into two distinct sample ranges, but a
shift of estimates towards the center of the full sample distribu-
tion. The third condition introduced an abstract symbolic cue.
The exact same order of displacement was used as in the second
condition, however, this time each production-reproduction task
was preceded by a verbal cue that indicated that the next dis-
placement will either belong to the short or to the long range of
displacements.
We assumed three potential scenarios representing how subjects
might deal with this additional abstract knowledge. Either they
ignore the symbolic cue and rely solely on their short-term prior
experience. Then the observed behavior resemble that in con-
dition two. Or subjects make full use the cue to separate the
33
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tested displacements into two distinct ranges. Then the behav-
ior should resemble that of condition one. Or, finally, subjects
may make use of the symbolic cue and at the same time also
rely on their short-term prior experience which should result in
a behavioral performance that resembles a mixture of condition
one and two.
We find that behavioral performance in condition three was sig-
nificantly different from that in condition two, however, no sig-
nificant difference was found compared to condition one. This
suggests that subjects are capable of exploiting the information
provided by the abstract verbal cue for their estimate of displace-
ment.
Two alternations of the basic iterative model in chapter 2 are pro-
posed that test two different generative versions of how the ad-
ditional a-priori knowledge, the sensory input and prior experi-
ence are incorporated in the Bayesian estimation process to yield
a combined estimate of displacement (cue-combination and cate-
gorization). Both versions account equally well for the observed
behavior.
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Perception and action are the result of an integration of various sources of information,
such as current sensory input, prior experience, or the context in which a stimulus occurs.
Often, the interpretation is not trivial hence needs to be learned from the co-occurrence
of stimuli. Yet, how do we combine such diverse information to guide our action? Here
we use a distance production-reproduction task to investigate the influence of auxiliary,
symbolic cues, sensory input, and prior experience on human performance under three
different conditions that vary in the information provided. Our results indicate that subjects
can (1) learn the mapping of a verbal, symbolic cue onto the stimulus dimension and (2)
integrate symbolic information and prior experience into their estimate of displacements.
The behavioral results are explained by to two distinct generative models that represent
different structural approaches of how a Bayesian observer would combine prior experi-
ence, sensory input, and symbolic cue information into a single estimate of displacement.
The first model interprets the symbolic cue in the context of categorization, assuming
that it reflects information about a distinct underlying stimulus range (categorical model).
The second model applies a multi-modal integration approach and treats the symbolic cue
as additional sensory input to the system, which is combined with the current sensory
measurement and the subjects’ prior experience (cue-combination model). Notably, both
models account equally well for the observed behavior despite their different structural
assumptions.The present work thus provides evidence that humans can interpret abstract
symbolic information and combine it with other types of information such as sensory input
and prior experience. The similar explanatory power of the two models further suggest
that issues such as categorization and cue-combination could be explained by alternative
probabilistic approaches.
Keywords:pre-cueing,path integration, cue-combination,multi-modal, categorization,experience-dependent prior,
magnitude reproduction, iterative Bayes
INTRODUCTION
Because the demands in natural tasks are highly complex but sen-
sory information is corrupted by noise, humans are versed in
exploiting contextual information. To improve efficiency, reduce
the amount of computational costs, and allow fast adaption to the
outside world, we infer existing dependencies and combine rele-
vant information to guide our perception and action. The sources
of information can vary from the simultaneous input coming from
different senses (Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004; Angelaki et al., 2009)
or distinct input from one sensory modality (Jacobs, 1999; Stone
et al., 2009), over short and long-term experience (Adams et al.,
2004; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Verstynen and Sabes, 2011),
to abstract expectations and contextual cues in the environment
(Langer and Bülthoff, 2001).
A possible framework for combining these diverse sources of
uncertain information is offered by Bayesian probability theory,
which has proven applicable to several of the mentioned issues.
It provides a normative, mathematical description of how various
sources of information can bemerged to obtain a statistically opti-
mal estimate of their cause in the presence of uncertainty. One of
the most common applications of the Bayesian approach is multi-
modal cue integration, where the provided information about a
stimulus results from different sensory modalities, such as vision,
audition,or proprioception (Ernst andBanks,2002;Battaglia et al.,
2003; Körding et al., 2007).
Senses, however, are not the only source of information that
determines our perception. Contextual and symbolic cues can also
contribute as a new source of information. In visual search par-
adigms, contextual cues are known to influence reaction times
(e.g., Müller et al., 2003; Vincent, 2011). The context can also lead
to an internal organization of stimuli into distinct categories that
influence perception by leading to an increased ability to discrim-
inate between categories at the expense of discriminability within
categories. Examples for category effects range from the percep-
tion of speech sounds (Liberman et al., 1957) or colors (Davidoff
et al., 1999) to facial expressions (Etcoff and Magee, 1992). A
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Bayesian explanation for category effects in speech perception was
offered by Feldman et al. (2009). However, their solution only
treats implicit predefined categories, not auxiliary contextual cues
providing information about these categories, e.g., pre-cueing.
Another type of contextual information comes from the pre-
ceding occurrence of a stimulus in the form of prior experience.
Bayesian probability theory has been successfully applied to a
broad spectrum of studies exploring the effect of short or long-
term experience on our current percept (Adams et al., 2004;
Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Verstynen and Sabes, 2011). For
humanestimationof distances and turning angles in a production-
reproduction task, we have recently shown that the effect of prior
experience results in a varying bias depending on the underlying
sample range (Petzschner and Glasauer, 2011). The participants’
behavior was best explained by an iterative Bayesian estimate
derived from the current noisy measurement merged with infor-
mation from short-term prior experience, which is updated on a
trial by trial basis.
Sensory input is often embedded not just in the temporal con-
text of prior experience, but occurs together with other indirect
cues that provide a contextual environment helping to interpret
the sensory input. These indirect or symbolic cues join together
with sensory input and experience to yield a uniform percept.
While there is a considerable body of research on multi-modal
sensory fusion, the mechanisms of integration of symbolic cues
into sensory perception are less well understood.
The present work aims to clarify the role of auxiliary contextual
cues on behavior that is known to be influenced by prior expe-
rience. We extended our distance production-reproduction task
(Petzschner and Glasauer, 2011) to include a symbolic cue that
supplied additional, but initially uncertain information about the
stimulus value. The symbolic cue values were provided as a written
instruction prior to each trial and indicated whether the distance
to be reproduced would be “short” or “long.” The cue values cor-
responded to two ranges of distances.We investigated whether (1)
subjects could use such a symbolic cue that provided reliable but
imprecise information about the sample distances and (2) how this
abstract information influenced their estimation process. To eval-
uate the behavioral results in the cue conditionweused two control
conditions that mimicked the extreme cases of cue usage. In the
first control condition, we presented participants with exactly the
same distances in the same order, but without the symbolic cue.
In the second control condition the “short” and “long” ranges of
displacements were presented in a separate order. Thus, if subjects
ignored the symbolic cue, we expected that the performance in
the cue condition would resemble that of the first control condi-
tion. If subjects however separated their estimates based on the
symbolic cue, the behavior should be similar to the second control
condition.
We then compare the behavioral data to predictions of two
distinct Bayesian observer models, the categorical and the cue-
combination model, which are founded on qualitatively different
assumptions about the causal relationship between the sensory
stimulus and the symbolic cue and consequently, about how the
mapping of the symbolic cue to the stimulus dimension is learned
during the experiment. Both models are based on our previously
published basic iterative model (Petzschner andGlasauer, 2011, see
Figure 1A) and generate a combined estimate of the distance to
be reproduced given the observed stimulus, the symbolic cue, and
prior experience. In addition, in both models Kalman filters are
used to dynamically update the prior experience and to learn the
relation between sensory stimulus and symbolic cue.
The two models differ in how the symbolic cue is merged with
prior experience and sensory input into a distance estimate. This
difference corresponds to different assumptions about the causal
outside world structures between the stimulus, the measurement,
and the symbolic cue (see Figure 1). In the categorical model,
the idea is that the symbolic cue helps to identify an underly-
ing stimulus category (Feldman et al., 2009). The model is based
on the assumption that in the outside world, in each trial one
of two categories is chosen, which determines the range of test
distances. The test distance, which is drawn randomly from the
respective category, leads to a noisy distance measurement. In
addition, the symbolic cue signifies the chosen category with a
certain reliability (Figure 1B). In the cue-combination model, it
is assumed that the symbolic cue provides additional informa-
tion similar to a sensory signal from a different modality (e.g.,
Ernst and Banks, 2002). The cue-combination model has a dif-
ferent view on the outside world. As our previous basic iterative
model (Petzschner and Glasauer, 2011), it assumes the test dis-
tances are drawn from a single range, instead of distinct categories.
The chosen test distance leads to a noisy distance measurement
and to a noisy cue signal, which determines the symbolic cue
(Figure 1C).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty volunteers (nine female) aged 20–29, who had all normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive to the purpose of
the experiments, took part in the study. Participation was mone-
tarily compensated. The experiments were approved by the local
ethics committee and conducted in accordance with Declaration
of Helsinki.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Stimuli were viewed binocularly on a PnP monitor driven by an
NVIDIA GeForce 8800 GTX graphics card at a frame rate of 60Hz
and with a monitor resolution of 1920× 1200. All experiments
were carried out in complete darkness except for the illumina-
tion by the monitor. The real-time virtual reality (VR) was cre-
ated using Vizard 3.0 (Worldviz, http://www.worldviz.com/ and
depicted the same artificial stone desert as described in Petzschner
and Glasauer (2011), consisting of a textured ground plane, 200
scattered stones that served as pictorial depth cues, and a tex-
tured sky (Figure 2). The orientation of the ground plane texture,
the position of the stones, and the starting position of the par-
ticipant within the VR were randomized in each trial to prevent
participants from using landmark cues to calibrate their estimate
of displacement. The sky was simulated as a 3D dome centered
on the participant’s current position and thus the distance to the
horizon was kept constant. In the VR each participant’s eye height
was adjusted individually to his/her true eye height. A multi-
directional movable joystick (SPEEDLINK) was used to change
the position with a constant speed.
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FIGURE 1 | Bayesian networks of the generative probabilistic models
corresponding to the estimation part (i.e., dependence on previous trials
not shown).The assumed probabilistic dependencies are shown as arrows.
(A) Basic iterative model as described in Petzschner and Glasauer (2011). The
stimulus S is a noisy measurement of the target distanceT that is drawn
from a single underlying category A. (B) Categorical model: the target
distanceT and the discrete symbolic cue C depend on the choice of the
underlying category A. Again, the stimulus S is a noisy measurement of the
target distanceT. (C) Cue-combination model: The stimulus S and cue signal
Cmp represent both independent noisy measurements of the target distanceT
that is drawn from a single underlying category A. The cue signal Cmp is
mapped to the symbolic cue C. The striped background in (A,C) indicates that
T is assumed to be drawn from a single category A in contrast to (B) were
target distance and cue depend on the choice of the underlying category.
FIGURE 2 | Schematic time course of a single trial. Subjects had to
subsequently produce and reproduce a sample distance in a virtual reality
using the joystick to change their position with a constant speed. The final
position was indicated via button press. In the IR-C condition each
production-reproduction block was preceded by a symbolic cue that
declared the upcoming sample displacement to be either “short” or “long.”
No symbolic cue was displayed in the IR-NC and BR-NC conditions.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Subjects had to estimate traveled distances in a production-
reproduction task in three different experimental conditions,
“blocked-ranges, no cue” (BR-NC), “interleaved-ranges, no cue”
(IR-NC), and“interleaved-ranges, cue” (IR-C). The task remained
the same for all three conditions.
Task
In each trial subjects were asked to “produce” a certain sample
distance, by using a joystick to move forward through the virtual
environmentona linear path toward thedirectionof a visual object
at the horizon of the virtual world until they were automatically
stopped for 2.25 s. During that time they received an instruction to
subsequently “reproduce” the same amount of displacement that
they had experienced during the production phase. Throughout
the reproduction phase subjects continued moving in the same
direction as in the production phase and indicated via button
press when they thought they had covered the same distance as
in the production phase. In the condition with cues the symbolic
cue was presented before the production phase. Figure 2 displays
a schematic overview of the time course of events in a single trial.
In all trials velocity was kept constant during one movement, but
changed randomly up to ±60% (scaling factors between joystick
output and constant VR velocity were drawn from a normal dis-
tribution) between production and reproduction phase to exclude
time estimation strategies to solve the task.
Experimental conditions
Each experimental condition consisted of 110 trials. The first 10
trials per condition were training trials and served to familiarize
participants with the task andVR. During these 10 trials, feedback
on the performance was given after the reproduction phase by ask-
ing subjects to navigate toward an object that was displayed at the
correct distance in the VR. The following 100 trials were test trials
without any feedback. Only test trials were used for data analysis.
After 50 trials subjects had a short break of 100 s to relax their
hands. During that time the subjects did not leave their position
and the room remained dark. Different experimental conditions
were separated by a break for no less than 15min outside the room
of the experiment. In all three conditions the overall number of
repetitions for each sample distance remained the same, thus the
overall distribution of samples was the same for all three condi-
tions. The same trial order within one condition as well as the
same order of cues in the cued condition was maintained for all
participants. The three experimental conditions were performed
in a randomized order.
“Blocked-ranges, no cue” condition. In the BR-NC condition
the 100 test distances were drawn in two blocks from two differ-
ent underlying uniform sample distributions referred to as “short”
range ([5, 7, 9, 11, 13] m) and“long” range ([11, 13, 15, 17, 19] m).
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In the first block of 50 trials the sample distances were randomly
drawn from the“short”rangedistribution; sample distances for the
second block of 50 trials were randomly drawn from the “long”
range distribution. The two blocks were separated by a short break
of 100 s. Within each range each sample distance was repeated 10
times in a randomized order. Note that the 11 and 13-m dis-
tances appeared in both the “short” and “long” range distribution,
and were thus repeated 20 times in the overall condition. Thus,
we refer to these displacements as overlapping samples. Subjects
received no additional information about the underlying sample
distribution (Figure 3A).
“Interleaved-ranges, no cue” condition. In the IR-NC condition
the same sample distances of the two distributionswere tested as in
the BR-NC condition, however in a interleaved order resulting in
one randomized, non-uniform sample distribution [5, 7, 9, 11, 13,
15, 17, 19] m. All samples were repeated 10 times during the over-
all condition, except the 11 and 13-m distance, which were again
repeated 20 times. As above subjects received no additional infor-
mation about the underlying sample distribution (Figure 3B).
“Interleaved-ranges, cue” condition. In the IR-C condition sam-
ple distances were tested in the exact same order as in the
FIGURE 3 | Overview of the three experimental conditions. Left: time
course of one trial in the distance production-reproduction task. Middle:
distribution and trial sequence for the blocked and interleaved-ranges.
Right: Potential behavioral response. (A) BR-NC condition: the two sample
ranges were tested in a blocked order. In the first half of the trials a range
of “short” displacements was tested, in the second half of the condition a
range of “long” distances was tested. Both ranges were overlapping for
two distances (11 and 13m) (B) IR-NC condition: The same displacements
as in (A) where tested in the production-reproduction task, but in a
interleaved order resulting in one non-uniform range of randomized sample
displacements. (C) IR-C condition: displacements were tested in the exact
same order as in (B), but each trial started with a symbolic cue that
indicated either a “short” or “long” displacement. No further information
was provided. Depending on the influence of the symbolic cue the
resulting behavior could range between the extreme cases mimicked
in (A,B).
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IR-NC condition based on one non-uniform sample distribution
(Figure 3C). However this time subjects were told that there are
two different types of samples referred to as “short” and “long”
distances and that, in order to improve their performance, they
would receive a written, symbolic cue that indicated which type
the upcoming distance would belong to. No further information
on the meaning of “short” and “long”was provided. At the begin-
ning of each trial the sample distance was assigned on the screen
to belong to one of the two types (“The next test distance will
be short” or “The next test distance will be long”). All distances
ranging from 5 to 9m and one half of the 11 and 13-m distance
samples were announced as being “short,” all distances ranging
from 15 to 19m and the other half of the 11 and 13-m distances
were announced as being“long.”Thus the symbolic cuewas always
valid, except for distances 11 and 13m, where the same distance
could either be referred to as “short” or “long.” Consequently, the
separation provided by the symbolic cue is comparable to the two
temporally separate ranges in the BR-NC condition.
DATA ANALYSIS
Participants’ position and orientation within theVRwere sampled
at 20Hz. The reproduced displacement was calculated as the dif-
ference between the position at the time of the button press and
the produced displacement.
To test for differences in the behavior that are due to
the use of the underlying sample range or the written sym-
bolic cue, trials in all three conditions were split into two
groups, the ranges “short” and “long.” For the BR-NC condi-
tion, where the two distributions were tested consecutively, this
was achieved by splitting the trials into two halves (“short”:
trials 1–50; “long”: trials 51–100). In both the IR-NC and
IR-C condition trials were split according to the symbolic
cue (“short” and “long”) given in the IR-C condition. Note
that we also split the IR-NC condition in order to provide a
direct comparison of the same trials with and without sym-
bolic cue.
Differences in the behavioral data for the two ranges can be eas-
ily examined by comparing across those displacements that were
tested in both ranges (11 and 13m). Thus we refer to the com-
parison of 11 and 13m between the “short” and “long” range as
“overlapping samples comparison.”
Data analysis was conducted in MATLAB R2010b (Math-
Works). Statistical differences were assessed using repeated-
measures analysis of variance (rm-ANOVA). A probability level
of p< 0.05 was considered significant for all statistical analy-
sis. To assess differences between conditions and ranges we used
rm-ANOVA for the “overlapping samples comparison” with the
within-subjects factors condition (BR-NC, IR-NC, IR-C), range
(“short” vs. “long”) and distance (two distances, 11 and 13m).
Since the use of the symbolic cue should have an effect not
just on the “overlapping samples,” but also on the whole set
of presented distances, we tested the difference between condi-
tions by a second rm-ANOVA for the mean reproduction error
with the within-subject factors condition (BR-NC, IR-NC, IR-
C) and distance (10 distances, see “Blocked-Ranges, No Cue”
Condition).
MODELING
In our previous study we proposed a model of iterative Bayesian
estimation that explained subjects performance in a distance
production-reproduction task by the incorporation of prior expe-
rience into the estimationprocess (Petzschner andGlasauer,2011).
This basic iterative model is applied to explain the data for the
two conditions without symbolic cue (BR-NC and IR-NC) in the
present work (Figure 1A). For the symbolic cue condition (IR-C)
themodelmust be extended to incorporate information that is not
only driven by prior experience but the symbolic cue itself. Impor-
tant for such an extension is the interpretation of the symbolic cue.
Neither the symbolic cue itself nor the experimental instruction
specified (1) the value or range of values in the stimulus dimen-
sion it corresponds to, and (2) the proportion of trials in which
the symbolic cue is actually valid.
Asmentioned in the Introduction,we propose two qualitatively
different ideas how the symbolic cue could be interpreted, how the
mapping of the symbolic cue to the stimulus dimension is learned,
andhow it is finally integrated into the estimationprocess. Thefirst
interpretation, referred to as categorical model, assumes that the
symbolic cueC is an indicator for a categoryA that determines the
distribution from which the target distance T, that is the distance
to be reproduced, is being drawn (Figure 1B). This interpretation
corresponds largely to the categorical model proposed by Feldman
et al. (2009), except that in their model there is no symbolic cue
provided to the observer. The second interpretation, referred to as
cue-combination model, assumes that the target T is drawn from
one single distribution and the symbolic cueC provides additional
evidence about T just like a sensory cue from another modality
(Figure 1C). Thus, this second interpretation leads to a multi-
modal fusion model in which one sensory input S, the stimulus
measurement, is continuous and the other sensory input C, the
symbolic cue, is discrete.
In the following, the two models are described in detail. Each
model has three free parameters,which are explained in the respec-
tive section.We first describe the estimation part that fuses sensory
measurement, symbolic cue, and prior experience. We then sepa-
rately describe the update part that implements a discrete Kalman
Filter as iterative Bayesian algorithm to update cue-related pri-
ors (categorical model) or calibrate likelihoods (cue-combination
model).
The estimation part of the two models is also illustrated in
Figure 4 by displaying how the prior information, the sym-
bolic cue, and the sensory likelihood function are transformed
into a posterior distribution, which determines the reproduced
distance.
We use amathematical notationwherewe refer to randomvari-
ables with upper case letters (e.g., A,S,T,C), to values for discrete
variables such as cue and category with indexed lower case letters
(e.g., ci), and to values for continuous variables such as the sensory
input with lower case letters (e.g., s). Furthermore, we abbreviate
notations such as P(T,A= ai | S,C) to P(T,ai | S,C).
Categorical model
The categorical model follows Feldman et al. (2009) for the defin-
ition of the distributions. We assume that the target distance T is
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FIGURE 4 | Schematic illustration of the Bayesian fusion in the symbolic
cue models. Only the estimation step is shown, which does not include
updating based on information from previous trials. (A) Categorical model: the
category priors are merged after weighting each prior with the conditional
probability of the respective category given the sensory input and the
symbolic cue. Then the resulting Gaussian mixture distribution (combined
prior) is fused with the stimulus measurement to derive the posterior. (B)
Cue-combination model: first the stimulus likelihood and the likelihood
corresponding to the current symbolic cue signal are fused. Then this fused
signal (cue+ stimulus) is combined with the prior, yielding the posterior.
drawn from a normally distributed category
T |A ∼ N ￿µA , σ2A￿ (1)
and that categories A= ai have individual means µai , but share
the same variance σ2A . Our generative model assumes that cate-
gories ai themselves are drawn uniformly from one of n possible
categories (n= 2 in the present experiment, see Figure 4 top
left). Due to measurement noise, T cannot be sensed directly,
but only the noisy measurement S with the conditional Gaussian
distribution
S|T ∼ N ￿T , σ2S￿ . (2)
In addition to the direct stimulus measurement S, participants
are presented with a symbolic cue value cj, which provides infor-
mation about the underlying category. Nevertheless there is some
uncertainty associated with the symbolic cue. Accordingly the
cue reliability, that is, the probability of the correct symbolic cue
value being presented, given a certain category aj, is specified as
pC= P(cj | aj) and assumed to be constant over trials. Accordingly
the probability of being presented with a wrong symbolic cue out
of n−1 remaining cues, is
P
￿
cj |ai￿ = 1− pCn − 1 . (3)
To reproduce the target distanceT, we are interested in the pos-
terior distribution P(T | S,C). To infer this posterior distribution,
we first calculate the probability P(T,A | S,C), which can be
derived by applying Bayes’ law to the complete joint distribution
P(T,A,S,C), and then marginalize over the category A:
P (T |S,C) =
n￿
i
P (T , ai |S,C) . (4)
We show in the Appendix that, with the conditional depen-
dency assumptions for this model (see Figure 1B), we can rewrite
the posterior as
P (T |S,C) =
n￿
i
P (T |S, ai) · P (ai |S,C). (5)
The category-dependent posteriors P(T | S,ai), which now are
independent of the symbolic cue C, are weighted by the poste-
rior probabilities P(ai | S,C) of the categories given stimulus S and
symbolic cue C.
To infer the target distance we compute the mean of the poste-
rior P(T | S,C). Analogous to the equation above, the mean of the
posterior can be computed as weighted sum of conditional expec-
tations of the category-dependent posteriors, where the weights
are again the posteriors of the categories.
E
￿
T |s, cj￿ = n￿
i
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿ E [T |s, ai]. (6)
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We show in the Appendix that this can be reformulated as
E
￿
T |s, cj￿ = wms + (1− wm) n￿
i
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿ · µai . (7)
That is, a weighted sum of the category means µai forms the
mean of a Gaussian mixture distribution (see Figure 4Amiddle),
and this mean is summed with measurement s weighted by wm.
The measurement weight wm is determined by the measurement
and category variances:
wm = σ
2
A
σ2A + σ2S
1− wm = σ
2
S
σ2A + σ2S
. (8)
Thus,wm is solely determined by the ratio σ2A/σ
2
S , which is one
of the free parameters of the model. In the Appendix we show that
the posteriors of the categories can be rewritten to
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿ = P ￿cj |ai￿ · αi,j (s) (9)
and thus depend on cue reliability and a measurement-dependent
factor αi,j(s):
αi,j (s) = P (s|ai)
pCP
￿
s|aj￿+ 1−pCn−1 n￿
k ￿=j
P (s|ak)
. (10)
Here we exploit the specific form of the cue reliability and
assume the categories to be uniformly distributed. The margin-
alization over T results in a normal distribution P(S |A) with
S|A ∼ N ￿µA , σ2S + σ2A￿ . (11)
Applying the assumption for the cue reliability to the posterior
expectation, we finally have
E
￿
T |s, cj￿ = wms + (1− wm)
×
pC · αj ,j (s) · µaj + 1− pCn − 1
n￿
i ￿=j
αi,j (s) ·µai
 .
(12)
The term within the large brackets is composed of the mean
of the correct category weighted by the cue reliability and the
weighted sum of all other category means.
The effect of this weighting is to select or suppress the correct
category, depending on the cue reliability parameter pC. The lat-
ter would correspond to a deliberately misleading symbolic cue.
Furthermore, the influence of the symbolic cue is balanced by the
probability of the measurement depending on the category, which
appears in αi,j(s).
In Feldman et al. (2009), the symbolic cue indicating the cate-
gory is not provided,which corresponds to an uninformative sym-
bolic cue.We can reflect this in ourmodel by settingP(cj | ai)= 1/n
for any i,j. We show in the Appendix that this indeed removes the
dependencyof the categoryposterior on the symbolic cue,yielding
E [T |s] = wms + (1− wm)
n￿
i
P (ai |s) ·µai . (13)
This corresponds to Eqs 10 and 11 in Feldman et al. (2009) for
equal category variance.
The posterior of T is a Gaussian mixture distribution, whose
mean is not necessarily equal to its mode. However, the Gauss-
ian measurement likelihood typically dominates the posterior,
because its variance is small compared to the combined variance
of the prior distributions corresponding to the categories. This
yields a near Gaussian posterior as illustrated in Figure 4.
Cue-combination model
Instead of assuming that the symbolic cue signifies a category of
sensory stimuli, it can also be conceived as providing additional
information about the location of the stimulus in the sensory
dimension. Under this assumption, the target distance T is drawn
from a single distribution
T ∼ N ￿µT , σ2T ￿ (14)
with the stimulus S being a noisy reading of T
S|T ∼ N ￿T , σ2S￿ . (15)
The intuition behind the cue-combination model is that the
same mechanism of multi-modal sensory fusion (e.g., Ernst and
Banks, 2002), which the brain might use to combine different
sensory modalities, is used to merge sensory and symbolic infor-
mation. From an observer point of view, this requires an inference
mechanism that maps the symbolic cue C to a continuous cue
signal Cmp. We call this signal the mapped cue. This signal is
then merged with the sensory signal S and prior T in the usual
Bayesian fashion. From a generative point of view, this inference
inverts the causal relationships assumed for the outside world (see
Figure 1C). In particular, Cmp is discretized by a step function to
yield C. Our update mechanism, described further below, learns
to map each cue value ci to a cue signal value cmp that falls into
the corresponding range. This corresponds to learning the thresh-
olds of the step function. This mapping is deterministic, thus the
cue signal becomes a known quantity, similar to actual observa-
tions. We can therefore derive the estimation step using Cmp only,
leaving out C.
The cue signal Cmp has a likelihood function that corresponds
to the average location anddispersion associatedwith the symbolic
cue (see Figure 4B)
Cmp|T ∼ N ￿µC (T ) , σ2C￿ . (16)
Note that Cmp depends on T in a more complex way than S,
reflected by the non-linear mapping µC(T ) We treat the cue sig-
nal Cmp the same way as the observation S. The mapping of the
symbolic cue to the cue signal depends on the value of C and is
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updated iteratively. This updating can be understood as learning
or calibration of the symbolic cue values (see Iterative update).
The optimal estimate of the target distance T is provided by a
sensory fusion of the stimulus, the cue signal, and the prior
P
￿
T |S,Cmp￿ ∝ P (S|T ) · P ￿Cmp|T ￿ · P (T ) . (17)
Withwm as weight for themeasurement s andw fu as weight for
the fused signal composed of mapped cue cmp and measurement
s, the mean for the posterior is computed as follows:
E
￿
T |s, cmp￿ = (1− wfu) · µT + wfu · ￿(1− wm) · cmp + wm · s￿ .
(18)
The weights w fu and wm result from the variances of target,
stimulus, and symbolic cue:
wfu = σ
2
T
σ2T + σ2CS
wm = σ
2
C
σ2S + σ2C
. (19)
The combined variance σ2CS of symbolic cue and stimulus is
σ2CS =
σ2Cσ
2
S
σ2C + σ2S
. (20)
Note that in the indicies we wrote C instead of Cmp for brevity.
A more detailed derivation of the expectation of the posterior is
provided in the Appendix. In short, since prior, combined likeli-
hood, and their product are Gaussians, the mean of the posterior
is given by a weighted sum of prior mean and the weighted sum
of mapped cue and measurement (see Figure 4 right).
Iterative update
Prior experience as well as cue mapping are not available at the
start of the experiment but need to be acquired and updated over
the course of the trials. Such updating on a trial by trial basis can
be achieved by a discrete Kalman filter updating internal states at
each time step. In our case, the states correspond to the means of
the two categories in case of the categorical model, to themeans of
the two symbolic cue likelihoods for the cue-combination model,
and to the distance prior in case of the previously published basic
iterative model (see Petzschner and Glasauer, 2011).
In both models, the symbolic cue is used to decide which cate-
gory mean will be updated or which symbolic cue likelihood will
be learned. The updating of the category means is an extension
of our basic iterative model from one single category to multiple
categories (see also Feldman et al., 2009). The iterative updating
of the mean of the symbolic cue likelihood can be interpreted as
learning the non-linear mapping of the symbolic cue to the stim-
ulus dimension or as calibration of the symbolic cue in terms of a
distance.
ForGaussiannoise and linear dynamics, theKalmanfilter yields
an estimate of the current state. The current state is estimated
based on the current observation and the estimate of the state at
the previous time step, taking into account a deterministic tempo-
ral evolution of the state. The state x to be updated and the current
measurement y at trial i are described by the system equations
xi = xi−1 + nq
yi = xi + nr . (21)
The random variables nq and nr represent the process andmea-
surement noise,which are assumed to be independent withGauss-
ian probability distributions P(nq)≈N (0, q) and P(nr)≈N (0, r).
The temporal evolution of the state x defined by these equations
can be seen as a random walk governed by the process noise. The
measurement y is a noisy version of x.
For such a simple system, it can be shown that the difference
equation system of the Kalman filter reduces to
ki = pi−1 + qpi−1 + q + r
pi = ki · r
xˆi = (1− ki) · xˆi−1 + ki · yi
(22)
with ki being the Kalman gain, xˆi−1 and xˆi being the a priori and
a posteriori estimate of the state (e.g., a category mean) at trial i,
and pi−1 the corresponding variance of that quantity. Note that it
is evident from this equation that the Kalman gain ki can be inter-
preted as weight of the measurement depending on measurement
noise and the assumed random change of the estimated quantity,
such as a category mean. The new estimate is thus a weighted sum
of the previous estimate and the current measurement.
The update for the categorical model employs a Kalman filter
for each categorymean to be estimated, yielding equations indexed
by j :
µaj ,i =
￿
1− kji
￿
· µaj ,i−1 + kji · si . (23)
For two categories we consequently have two Kalman filters,
one for each category mean. The variances σ2A and σ
2
S correspond
to quantities pi and r, respectively. Note that the ratio of the two
variances only depends on the ratio q/r, which is one of the free
model parameters.
The cue-combination model uses three Kalman filters to cal-
ibrate the two symbolic cue likelihoods and to update the prior
for the target distance T using the same general form of update
equations as described above.
c jmp,i =
￿
1− kji
￿
· c jmp,i−1 + kji · si (24)
µT ,i =
￿
1− kTi
￿
· µT ,i−1 + kTi · si . (25)
The calibration of the symbolic cue likelihoods yields the
mapped cues used in the estimation.
Logarithmic stimulus representation
There is some indication that magnitudes are internally repre-
sented in the brain on a log-scale (Fechner, 1860; Dehaene, 2003;
Jürgens and Becker, 2006; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Durgin
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et al., 2009). In Petzschner and Glasauer (2011) we showed that
defining a Bayes-optimal observer on log-scales leads to an elegant
combination of Steven’s power law with the Weber–Fechner law
(Fechner, 1860; Stevens, 1961). The estimates in our models in the
present work are again computed based on simplified logarith-
mic representations of the presented stimuli. In conjunction with
that stands an additional parameter that can represent different
optimal decision strategies in subjects. We shortly recap the idea
here and refer to Petzschner and Glasauer (2011) for a detailed
treatment. The logarithmic representation is given as
s = ln
￿
dm
d0
￿
+ nm. (26)
The internal representation of the measurement s is computed
as the natural logarithm of the measurement on linear scales, dm.
In the present work, dm is given in virtual meters. To achieve
a unit-less representation, dm is normalized with the small con-
stant d0￿ 1. The random variable nm represents the normally
distributed measurement noise P(nm) ≈ N (0, σ2S).
The estimate xest, corresponding to E[T | s,cj] for the categor-
ical model and E[T | s,cmp] for the cue-combination model, is a
log-scale value. It is transformed back to a linear scale with
dr = exest+∆x · d0. (27)
The result is the linear scale reproduction dr in virtual meters.
We assume here that, apart from this transformation and possibly
additional noise, the reproduction in subjects corresponds to the
estimate.
The value ∆x accounts for different decision strategies of the
subjects. A decision strategy collapses the posterior distribution
into a single value, the estimate, which is optimal in the sense
that it minimizes the expected loss due to the deviation from
the real value (the real distance in our case). Typical decision
strategies use the mean, median, or mode of a distribution as
optimal (loss-minimal) estimate, which correspond to three typi-
cal loss functions (Körding andWolpert, 2004).While these values
are equal for normal distributions, they are different in our case,
since the normal distribution transfers into a log-normal distrib-
ution after back-transformation. For the log-normal distribution
mean, median, and mode differ by a linear shift of xest. Therefore,
by introducing an additional parameter ∆x in our models, we
account for different types of loss functions.We call this parameter
the shift term.
Model fit
To analyze how well our models explain the experimental results,
we fitted their free parameters such that the difference between
model output and subject responses was minimized.
The free parameters in the categorical model are the cue relia-
bility pC, the ratio σ2A/σ
2
S of the noise in the target distances and
the measurement noise, and the shift term ∆x reflecting the loss
function of the Bayesian estimator. The ratio σ2A/σ
2
S determines
the weight of the measurement wm relative to the category priors.
This weighting schema reflects how subjects may put more weight
on whichever quantity has less variance.
The free parameters of the cue-combinationmodel are the shift
term ∆x and two ratios. The first is the ratio of target distance
noise to the combined noise in measurement and continuous cue
signal, σ2T /σ
2
S . The second is the ratio of the noise in the cue signal
to the measurement noise, σ2C/σ
2
S . Analogous to the categorical
model, these ratios determine the relative weights w fu and wm,
respectively. The first is the weight of the combined measurement
and cue signal relative to the prior, the second the measurement
weight relative to the cue signal.
The basic iterativemodel has two free parameters, the shift term
∆x and the ratio of target distance noise to measurement noise,
σ2T /σ
2
S . This ratio determines the measurement weight wm of this
model.
For the IR-C condition we fitted the category and cue-
combination models to the responses of each single subject. That
is, for each subject two sets of parameters were generated, corre-
sponding to the two models. For the other two conditions, our
models reduce to the iterative Bayesian estimation model (Pet-
zschner and Glasauer, 2011), which we fitted in these cases. All
models were fitted byminimizing the squared differences of model
output and subject response in each trial using theMatlab function
lsqnonlin.
The correct order of sample displacements over all trials in one
condition was used as input to the models. Kalman filters in the
models were initialized with the first observation, that is the first
produced distance of the subject in the given condition.
To assess the precision of the fitted parameters, we estimated
95% confidence intervals of all parameters that were determined
from the Jacobian of the parameter surface at the minimum using
the Matlab function nlparci.
Model comparison
We compared the models’ goodness of fit by comparing their
coefficients of determination R2. The coefficient of determina-
tion assesses the proportion of variability in the mean data that
is accounted for by the respective model. To test for a significant
difference in the R2 of the two model fits across subjects we used
the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (Matlab procedure
signrank).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
In order to test the effect of an additional symbolic cue on the
estimation of distances we used three experimental conditions.
One condition tested the cue influence directly (IR-C condition)
while the other two served as reference conditions for the extreme
cases of the cue effect, i.e., ignoring the cue (IR-NC) or using the
symbolic cue as perfectly reliable indicator for the stimulus range
(BR-NC). The average results of all three conditions are presented
in Figure 5 (left side).
Differences between conditions can be assessed by compar-
ing the estimation of overlapping samples, that is, displacements
that were assigned to the “short” as well as to the “long” distribu-
tion. However, assigning distances to a short or long range should
not only affect the overlapping distances, but the estimation and
consequently the reproduction errors for all distances presented.
Condition-dependent differences in distance reproduction should
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occur either due to the influence of short-term prior experience
or induced by the symbolic cue.
Comparison of distance errors
The comparison of the distance reproduction error shows a
main effect of distance [F(9,38)= 136.2, p< 0.0001] together
FIGURE 5 | Group mean of all subjects (left) and respective model
predictions (right).The group mean corresponds to the mean taken over
all subjects for the whole trial sequence. Models were accordingly fitted to
the resulting “mean trial sequence.” The rows (A–C) show the results for
the three conditions BR-NC, IR-NC, and IR-C respectively. The IR-NC and
BR-NC were fitted with the basic iterative model introduced in Petzschner
and Glasauer (2011). Predictions for the cue condition IR-C were generated
with the categorical as well as cue-combination model. Error bars depict
the standard deviation of the reproduced distances across trials.
with a highly significant interaction of condition and distance
[F(18,342)= 3.45, p< 0.0001]. This interaction is due to a clear
separation of error patterns between conditions,which can be seen
in Figure 6where the differences between errors in the interleaved
condition (IR-NC) to the other two conditions are shown. Note
that in both conditions where the ranges were separated either
temporally (BR-NC) or by the symbolic cue (IR-C), the errors in
the low range correspondonaverage toovershoots,while the errors
in the high range correspond to undershoots with respect to those
in the interleaved conditionwithout cue (IR-NC). This correspon-
dence of error patterns also confirms that the symbolic cue causes
changes in distance estimation analogous to those found during
temporal dissociation of the two ranges. However the effect in the
IR-C condition is not as strong as in the BR-NC condition. Sep-
arate post hoc rm-ANOVAS with only two conditions shows that
for IR-C versus BR-NC this interaction vanishes [F(9,171)= 1.82,
p= 0.068 n.s.], while it remains highly significant for IR-C and
IR-NC [F(9,171)= 3.36, p= 0.0008]. Thus, while in IR-C and IR-
NC all distance stimuli were the same in magnitude and order,
the reproduced distances are clearly different, which shows that
the symbolic cue was used by the subjects in a way very similar to
exploiting the temporal separation of the two ranges in the BR-NC
condition.
Overlapping samples
The results for the whole range of distances are also supported
by the overlapping samples comparison, which reveals a signif-
icant interaction of condition× range (short/long) for all exper-
imental conditions [F(2,38)= 11.9, p= 0.0001]. This implies a
significant difference in the estimation of the two overlapping
distances depending on the experimental condition (see also,
Figure 5).
Separate ANOVAS with only two conditions revealed the indi-
vidual relationships between the conditions. Differences in sub-
jects’ behavior based solely on temporal order were determined
based on the comparison of the IR-NC and BR-NC condi-
tions (for a detailed description, see Materials and Methods).
FIGURE 6 | Mean behavioral differences between conditions. (A)
Difference between the IR-NC and the BR-NC conditions for the mean
reproduced distances. (B) Difference between the IR-NC and the IR-C
conditions for mean reproduced distances. The only difference between the
two conditions was the symbolic cue. Colors code the “short” and “long”
range of displacements respectively.
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In analogy with previous results, we find a significant interac-
tion of condition× range in the overlapping samples compar-
ison [F(1,19)= 26.5, p< 0.001], which confirms that temporal
order affects distance reproduction. By testing for the interaction
between the IR-C and IR-NC condition, we assessed exclusively
cue-based differences in subjects’ behavior. Again we find a sig-
nificant condition× range interaction for the overlapping samples
comparison [F(1,19)= 8.8, p< 0.01]. To compare performance
when the sample ranges were either separated by time or sym-
bolic cue, we performed an rm-ANOVA for the IR-C and BR-NC
condition. In this case we find no significant difference between
conditions in the overlapping samples comparison [interaction:
condition× range; F(1,19)= 3.6, p> 0.05 n.s]. Thus, as found
above, the symbolic cue leads to a behavior that resembles the per-
formance exhibited for presenting the stimuli in ranges separated
by time as in the BR-NC condition.
The post hoc analysis of the individual conditions supports
the results of the condition comparison. The rm-ANOVA of
the overlapping samples comparison reveals a significant differ-
ence for the estimation of the overlapping samples comparison
in the BR-NC condition [main effect: range (“short” vs. “long”)
F(1,19)= 25.7,p< 0.001] but no significant difference of theover-
lapping samples comparison in the IR-NC condition where no
separation between the ranges was provided [main effect: range
(“short” vs. “long”) F(1,19)= 1.3, p> 0.05]. Finally, the sym-
bolic cue in the IR-C condition caused a significant difference
in behavior based on the assigned range [overlapping samples
comparison: main effect: range (“short” vs. “long”); F(1,19)= 9.3,
p< 0.01].
MODELING
Our results show that the symbolic cue significantly affects the
reproduction of the stimuli in a way that is more similar to the
behavior in the BR-NC condition than to the one in the IR-C
condition. This raises the question how the knowledge about the
symbolic cue is incorporated into the estimation process.We com-
pare our twomodels by fitting them to the responses of each single
subject and also to the mean responses over all subjects computed
for the overall time course of trials, which we refer to as “group
mean.” Figure 5 depicts this group mean and the group mean fits
of our models.
Categorical model for condition IR-C
The categorical model assumes that the target distances presented
in each trial stem from one of two categories, and that the sym-
bolic cue informs about the given category in that trial. The
three free parameters of this model, the cue reliability, the mea-
surement weight, and the shift term, were estimated by a least
squared fit (group mean fit, R2= 0.92: pC= 0.74, CI95%= [0.70
0.78]; wm= 0.33; ∆x =−0.04, CI95%= [−0.05 −0.03]; individ-
ual participants fit: pC = 0.76 ± 0.13, range = [0.57 1.00];
wm = 0.32 ± 0.11, range = [0.06 0.48]; ∆x = −0.06 ± 0.19,
range = [−0.67 0.26]). The shift terms were not normally distrib-
uted over all subjects (Lillifors test, p= 0.02). Yet they show a
unimodal distribution with a peak close to the shift correspond-
ing to choosing the median of the posterior distribution as an
estimate.
Cue-combination model for condition IR-C
In contrast to the categorical model, the cue-combination model
assumes that target distances are drawn from one underlying
distribution and treats the symbolic cue as a second sensory
input to the system. Its three free parameters are the measure-
ment weight, the fusion weight, and the shift term. Analogous to
the categorical model they were fit using a least squares method
(group mean fit, R2= 0.91: wm= 0.38; w fu= 0.55; ∆x =−0.05,
CI95%= [−0.07 −0.03]; individual participants fit: wm = 0.39±
0.10, range = [0.18 0.50]; wfu = 0.54 ± 0.16, range = [0.25 0.81];
∆x =−0.07± 0.19, range = [−0.67 0.25]). As in the case of the
categorical model, shift terms fitted for the cue-combination
model were not normally distributed over all subjects (Lillifors
test, p= 0.03), yet showed a unimodal distribution with a peak
near the shift corresponding to the median.
Basic iterative model for conditions IR-NC and BR-NC
If the symbolic cue is abandoned, the two new models reduce
to the basic iterative model. For comparison, we fitted this
model on the two non-cue conditions IR-NC and BR-NC. The
model has two free parameters, which have been fitted for each
of these two conditions individually (IR-NC group mean fit:
wm= 0.33; ∆x =−0.05, CI95%= [−0.07 −0.03]; IR-NC indi-
vidual participants fit: wm = 0.33 ± 0.13, range = [0.03 0.48];
∆x = −0.07 ± 0.22, range = [−0.67 0.37]; BR-NC group mean
fit:wm= 0.34;∆x =−0.04,CI95%= [−0.06−0.02]; BR-NC indi-
vidual participants fit: wm = 0.33 ± 0.09, range = [0.14 0.49];
∆x = −0.04± 0.12, range = [−0.29 0.26]).
Model comparison
To compare the categorical and cue-combination model, we com-
puted R2 values for individual participant fits (see Figure 7)
in the IR-C condition (categorical model: R2 = 0.54 ± 0.15,
range = [0.31 0.88]; cue-combination model: R2 = 0.54 ± 0.15,
range = [0.24 0.88]) as well as for the group mean fits (categori-
cal model: R2= 0.92; cue-combination model: R2= 0.91). In the
other two conditionswithout a symbolic cue,our existing Bayesian
estimator model shows similar goodness of the individual partic-
ipant fits (IR-NC: R2 = 0.45± 0.18, range = [0.05 0.72]; BR-NC:
R2 = 0.51± 0.27, range = [−0.40 0.85]). And as in the IR-C con-
dition the groupmean fit turns out to be better (IR-NC:R2= 0.87;
BR-NC: R2= 0.88) than the individual estimates.
In comparing the goodness of fit of the categorical and the
cue-combination model (non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank
test), no significant difference between the two models could be
found (p> 0.45). We also tested whether the small differences of
the subject-by-subject R2 values that can be seen in Figure 7 are
related to the subjects’ response biases and variances. However, we
could not find any significant correlations (Spearman ranks test,
p> 0.13).
DISCUSSION
The context in which a stimulus occurs can contain additional rel-
evant information about the stimulus itself. It is thus advantageous
to combine all types of available information, in order to use the
composite as an estimate of the stimulus. Here we demonstrate
that this fusion of information takes place in distance estimation
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FIGURE 7 | Model Comparison. Bar plot of individual R2 values of the model fit for the categorical (gray) and cue-combination model (black) to each subjects’
behavior (1–20) in the IR-C condition. A comparison of the goodness of fit of the categorical and the cue-combination model revealed no significant difference
between the two models.
by path integration, where subjects incorporated prior experience
and abstract information provided by a symbolic cue into their
current estimate of displacement. We proposed two generative
Bayesian models that describe this fusion of information based on
two distinct assumptions – categorization and cue-combination.
CUE-BASED RANGE AND REGRESSION EFFECTS
The influence of the symbolic cue on distance estimation behavior
was assessed by comparing the cue condition (IR-C) to two ref-
erence conditions. Both mimicked the two possible extreme cases
of cue usage. The no cue condition BR-NC tested two overlapping
ranges of stimuli that were blocked in time, in order to change the
respective prior experience of subjects and mimicked the case in
which the pre-cueing by the words “short” or “long”would lead to
a full separation of stimuli into two groups of events or categories.
The IR-NC condition combined these two ranges to a single dis-
tribution of distances. The order and magnitude of stimuli was
exactly the same as in the IR-C condition, thus replicating the
cue condition for the case where the symbolic cue would be fully
ignored.
In all three experimental conditions we observed a tendency to
bias toward certain displacements, also referred to as regression
effect (Hollingworth, 1910). In the no-cue conditions BR-NC and
IR-NC the bias depended on the respective underlying sample
distribution and could be explained by incorporation of short-
term prior experience into the current estimate of displacements,
as shown in our previous study (Petzschner and Glasauer, 2011).
The behavior in the cue condition IR-C did not resemble that of
the IR-NC condition although the order and size of sample dis-
placements was the same. It was rather reflecting the behavior
observed for two distinct sample ranges in the BR-NC condition,
even though the effect was smaller.
Thus, the bias in the cue condition cannot be explained exclu-
sively by the use of prior experience. This led to the question of
how the additional symbolic cue information is processed. One
possible explanation comes from the studies on categorization
effects (Huttenlocher et al., 1991; Cheng et al., 2010). If there is
uncertainty in the stimulus metric, then information about stim-
ulus categories can be incorporated into the estimation process
(Huttenlocher et al., 1991; Feldman et al., 2009). In our case, the
symbolic cue could cause a sorting of stimuli into categories such
that the expectation about the upcoming stimulus varies depend-
ing on whether subjects assume the stimulus to be drawn from
the “short” or “long” category. We elaborated on this idea in the
categorical model.
Another possible explanation, which we pursued in our cue-
combination model, comes from a different field of research –
multi-modal sensory cue-combination (Ernst and Banks, 2002;
Ernst andBülthoff,2004). Similar to ourfindings,vonHopffgarten
and Bremmer (2011) showed in a recent study on self-motion
reproduction that subjects are capable of learning an abstract
relationship between a novel cue and the stimulus and exploit
that information to improve their performance. In their study,
the frequency of a simultaneous auditory signal indicated move-
ment speed and was used by the subjects to improve self-motion
reproduction. Their study provides evidence that subjects learned
the initially unknown frequency-velocity mapping provided by
the auditory cue, comparable to the mapping of the symbolic
cue to distance in our present experiment. Von Hopffgarten and
Bremmer argued that the observed behavior could be interpreted
by “sensory combination” (Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004), where the
auditory input served as an additional, non-redundant cue.
CATEGORICAL MODEL
The categorical model is based on the assumption that the stim-
ulus comes from one of two distinct, but perhaps overlapping,
categories of stimuli, each represented by its own probability dis-
tribution (Feldman et al., 2009). Accordingly the symbolic cue
provides information about the respective category. The order of
events in this generative model is as follows (Figure 1B): (1) the
category is chosen, (2) the information about the category is pro-
vided as symbolic cue, and (3) the stimulus is drawn from the
distribution corresponding to the category. Note that the symbolic
cue does not necessarily provide reliable information about the
category. Hence, the prediction of the symbolic cue for a respective
category is not always correct. The model represents this uncer-
tainty with a trial-independent probability that we refer to as cue
reliability.
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Since the categories are unknown, they have to be learned from
the symbolic cue values (“short” and “long” in the present exper-
iment) and the stimulus presentation. Note that the semantic
interpretation of the cue values is not sufficient to determine the
categories, since the cue values do not specify the ranges; they
only denote an order within the presented stimuli, i.e., that a
“short” distance probably is shorter than a “long” one. Learning is
achieved by iterative Bayesian estimation analogous to Petzschner
andGlasauer (2011). Our categoricalmodel is thus an extension of
themodel of Feldman et al. (2009) to explain the so-called percep-
tualmagnet effect in speech perception. In contrast to theirmodel,
where no pre-cueing was done and the categories were assumed to
be fixed, our model provides the symbolic cue values as additional
uncertain information about the category and allows learning of
the categorymeans during the course of the experiment. The vari-
ance of the prior distributions could also be learned during the
experiment (Berniker et al., 2010). However, in the present study
we assume that it is, apart from an initialization phase, constant
throughout the experiment. For other categorization tasks, such
as understanding of speech, it has been proposed that the learning
of weighting of acoustic cues for categorization might take place
during development (Toscano and McMurray, 2010).
The combination of categorical informationwith themeasured
stimulus value was also proposed in amodel byHuttenlocher et al.
(1991) for estimating spatial location. In their model categorical
information is used in two distinct ways. First the remembered
stimulus measurement is weighted with categorical prototype
information and second the resulting estimates are constrained
to fall within the category boundaries. In our model estimates
are not artificially restricted to certain boundaries, even though
the weighting with the learned mean of the respective category
will bias them toward this mean. Hence, our estimation process
explains the tendency to bias toward the category means, which is
reported in a variety of psychophysical studies. This central ten-
dency bias, schema, or range effect, causes a tendency of estimates
to be biased toward the category they where assigned to (Holling-
worth, 1910; Johnson and Vickers, 1987; Cheng et al., 2010).
The category model can be extended to an arbitrary number of
categories. However, introducing new categories or new cue val-
ues during the experiment would not only require learning of that
category, but also re-computing of the relative weights of the other
categories. In other words, a new category or new cue value should
directly affect the other categories.
In the present work the number of categories is predefined and
given by the number of cue values, but under many other circum-
stances this is not the case. Recent work (e.g., Lucas and Griffiths,
2010) addresses the question of how we determine the number of
categories in the context of learning of causal structures.While this
is not required in the present study, our cue-combination model,
which is independent of the number of cues, may well be capa-
ble of dynamically adapting to new cue values added during the
course of the experiment. This could be considered as a weaker
form of structural learning.
CUE-COMBINATION MODEL
In contrast to the categorical model, the cue-combination model
assumes that the stimulus comes from one continuous range of
stimuli and the pre-cueing provides additional evidence about
where in this range the current stimulus can be found. This idea is
similar to common models in sensory cue-combination, where
the sensory inputs from a common source are fused in order
to build a unified percept of its origin (Ernst and Banks, 2002;
Körding et al., 2007). In terms of a generative model, the order of
events in the cue-combinationmodel is as follows (Figure 1C): (1)
the stimulus is drawn from the underlying distribution, and (2)
the symbolic cue is determined from this stimulus by some map-
ping. In our current implementation, this mapping is assumed
to be probabilistic. Therefore, a large stimulus is assumed to
cause the respective symbolic cue value in most of the cases,
but at some occasions it can also lead to the other cue value.
Since the mapping between stimulus and cue value is not pre-
specified, it has to be learned over the course of the experiment.
This is achieved by iteratively adapting the mean of the likeli-
hood function associated to each symbolic cue value. In addition
to the unknown mapping, the underlying stimulus distribution
is learned during the experiment (as in Petzschner and Glasauer,
2011).
A more intuitive explanation of the cue-combination model
is provided from the observer point of view. Given the stimu-
lus and an additional corresponding cue one aims to combine
these two sources of information in an optimal manner. This
would require that the cue can be related to a certain displace-
ment value. This can be achieved by learning the relation between
the current stimulus distance and the respective cue on a trial
by trial basis. We refer to this process as mapping in the present
model.
Themapping of the symbolic cue values to the stimulus dimen-
sion does not require knowledge about the possible number of
cue values. Rather, the adaptation is similar to cue calibration, e.g.,
learning the transformation between one stimulus dimension and
another (Burge et al., 2010; Zaidel et al., 2011). Thus, in contrast
to the category model, adding another symbolic cue value during
the experiment would not require a change in the mapping of the
previously presented cues. This makes the model more flexible to
changes than the categorical model.
MODEL COMPARISON
Interestingly, the results of the categorical and cue-combination
model are very similar, although the underlying assumptions are
substantially different. The categorical model is based on an intu-
itive assumption about how the stimuli presented to the subjects
are generated: it assumes that there are two distinct categories,
from which the stimuli are drawn. This corresponds, for example,
to the categories in speech production, where a certain syllable
is produced or understood based on a distinct category. The cue-
combinationmodel does not assume such anunderlying structure,
but rather treats the symbolic cue as additional modality. Conse-
quently, the cue-combination model is more flexible to changes
in cueing while, at least for our experiment, being equally power-
ful in explaining the data compared to the categorical model. The
main reason for the similar performance of both models is, apart
from the experimental setting, the iterative updating of the“mean-
ing” associated with the symbolic cue, which leads to very similar
sources of information regarding the range of stimuli denoted by
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the cues. This information is, in bothmodels, weighted by reliabil-
ity either in form of a variance associated with the symbolic cue or
a probability that the symbolic cue is accurate. Thus, both models
can fairly well describe the behavior observed in our experiments:
our participants used the symbolic cue, they were able to associate
them with the stimulus magnitude, but they did not completely
trust them, as evidenced by the difference between the IR-C and
BR-NC conditions.
Similarly, both models would also have performed equally well
in predicting the two outcomes of cue usage mimicked in the IR-
NC and BR-NC condition (Figure 3). If the information provided
by the cue would not be incorporated into the estimate of the
displacements this would have resulted in a cue weighting close
to zero reflected by either a cue reliability that is close to 0.5 in
the categorical model or a very high cue variability in the cue-
combination model. An extreme cue usage, as mimicked by the
BR-NC condition, would have an opposite effect on the respective
parameters.
This raises the question under which circumstances the two
models would make different predictions. One major difference
between the two estimation processes lies in the different means
of incorporating prior knowledge. Consider Figures 4A,B. While
the categorical model uses a combined prior that is driven by
the occurrence of all respective cues, the cue-combination incor-
porates a global prior that only depends on short-term prior
experience of the stimuli independently of the corresponding cues.
We used the parameters derived from the fit of the experimental
data in this paper to test how these differences could lead to dif-
fering predictions of the cue-combination model and categorical
model under specific circumstances.
Imagine the case where the two ranges are clearly separated.
Due to the influence of the experience driven prior the cue-
combination model would be biased by the full range of all
displacements causing a global underestimation in the high range
and an overestimation of the short range of stimuli. In contrary,
the combined prior in the categorical model would show two dis-
crete peaks at the center of the respective categories and thus lead
to an estimate that is, for both ranges, centered closer to the single
category means. However, this strong bias in the cue-combination
model would only become evident if we assume a constant vari-
ance of the prior. If the variance of the prior is also updated on
a trial by trial basis (Berniker et al., 2010; Verstynen and Sabes,
2011), both models would again become similar.
Yet another case in which both models differ should become
obvious when omitting the cue in some catch trials. The cue-
combinationmodel would then reduce to the basicmodel and rely
on the global unimodal prior, thus resulting in a global tendency
to the mean (Petzschner and Glasauer, 2011). In contrast, the cat-
egorical model works with two prior distributions even when the
cue is missing. In that case, our categorical model reduces to the
category model of Feldman et al. (2009) and would exhibit the
perceptual magnet effect, which biases the reproduction toward
the category means.
Another difference should be observable in cases where the
presentation of the cue and stimulus is not fully randomized.
Consider a case where the “long” cue is repeatedly presented in
a block with a long displacement. The cue-combination model
would show a quick adaption of the global prior to these long
displacements, which would result in reproduction values biased
toward the long displacements. The categorical model would pre-
dict a much weaker adaption to the block as it still incorporates
all potential cues, the long as well as the short ones. In that respect
the categorical model seems to have a longer memory and less
flexibility for fast changes.
Finally, both models become mathematically equivalent for a
specific parameter combination. This is the case if the variance
of the global prior in the cue-combination model becomes large
enough and the cue reliability in the categorical model is set to
unity. That is, for the categorical model we have to set pC= 1 in
Eqs 10 and 12. For the cue-combination model, we set σ2T =∞ in
Eq. 20 so that w fu= 1. Then the conditional expectations for both
models (Eqs 12 and 19) become equivalent.
ITERATIVE LEARNING AND CALIBRATION
The no cue conditions demonstrated that subjects incorporated
knowledge about the stimulus history into their current estimate
of displacement. We model this iterative learning of prior knowl-
edge by a discrete Kalman filter. In our previous work we showed
that this online update of prior experience explains small varia-
tion in the data that a fixed prior could not account for (Petzschner
and Glasauer, 2011). That humans are indeed capable of learning
not only the mean but also the variance of an experience driven
prior distribution was also recently shown (Berniker et al., 2010;
Verstynen and Sabes, 2011).
The significant influence of the symbolic cue on the behav-
ioral performance in the cue condition further shows that most
subjects also included this information into their estimate of dis-
placement.Asmentioned above, the semantic interpretation of the
cue values was not sufficient to allow such a fusion of cue values
and sensory stimulus. Thus, subjects had to learn how to asso-
ciate both. The cue-combination model interprets this learning as
a mapping of the cue values onto the stimulus dimension. That
an abstract, even arbitrary,mapping of different types of informa-
tion can be acquired during the course of an experiment was also
shown by Ernst (2007). In his study subjects were trained with
stimuli that usually are unrelated in the world, such as the lumi-
nance of an object and its stiffness, but which in the experiment
had a fixed mapping. He showed that subjects learned to inte-
grate the two formerly unrelated signals, similar to themapping in
our models. Calibration is, however, not only necessary between
unrelated stimulus dimensions, but also between those which are
normally related, such as visual and vestibular signals indicating
self-motion. A recent study could show that such a calibration
is independent of the reliability of the cue (Zaidel et al., 2011),
which corresponds to the learning or calibration implemented in
our models.
CONCLUSION
Natural human action and perception profits from the incorpo-
ration of contextual information. We show that in addition to
the previously found influence of prior experience, humans are
also capable of using non-metric information, in the form of
a symbolic cue, for their estimate of displacement, even if the
mapping of the symbolic cue onto the stimulus dimension has
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to be acquired during the experiment. Two substantially differ-
ent models of how this information enters the estimation process
led to equally good fits to the experimental data. This result
sheds new light on the modeling of behavioral problems such as
categorization, cue-combination, and trial-to-trial dependencies.
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APPENDIX
CATEGORICAL MODEL
Our categorical model shall infer the target distance T from given measurement s and cue cj. Here we derive the posterior distribution
over T from known distributions, along with its conditional expectation. The posterior is given as
P (T |S,C) =
n￿
i
P (T , ai |S,C). (A1)
We have to marginalize over the categories because they are unknown. The key idea is now to express the posterior as a weighted
sum over distributions of which we can easily compute the expectation.
We first factorize the posterior within the sum to obtain a distribution of which we can easily compute its expectation. As it turns
out, it is the posterior of T given S and the category.
P (T , ai |S,C) = P (T |ai , S,C) · P (ai |S,C) . (A2)
Due to model assumptions concerning the factorization, the posterior of T does not depend on C once the category A is given. The
full joint distribution for our model, according to our assumptions (Figure 1B), factorizes as follows:
P (T ,A, S,C) = P (S|T ) P (T |A) P (C |A) P (A) . (A3)
We use this factorization of the full joint marginalize out T.
P (A, S,C) =
￿
P (C |A) P (S|t ) P (t |A) P (A) dt = P (C |A) P (A)
￿
P (S, t |A) dt = P (C |A) P (A) P (S|A). (A4)
Then, by applying Bayes’ theorem we, see
P (T |ai , S,C) = P (T , ai , S,C)P (ai , S,C) =
P (S|T ) P (C |ai) P (T |ai) P (ai)
P (C |ai) P (ai) P (S|ai) =
P (S|T ) P (T |ai) P (ai)
P (S|ai) P (ai) =
P (S|T , ai) P (T , ai)
P (S, ai)
= P (T |S, ai) .
(A5)
We, see that all factors depending onC cancel each other out. The posterior thus does not depend onC, givenA. Following the definition
of the expectation, we now have
E
￿
T |s, cj￿ = ￿ t n￿
i
P
￿
t , ai |s, cj￿dt = ￿ t n￿
i
P (t |s, ai) · P ￿ai |s, cj￿dt (A6)
with s and cj being the known distance measurement and the known cue. We, see that the posterior of the category P(ai | s,cj) does not
depend on t, which means we can do the following reordering. We pull t into the sum, exchange sum and integral and pull out the
posterior of the category:
E
￿
T |s, cj￿ = n￿
i
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿ ￿ t P (t |s, ai) dt . (A7)
The integral expresses the expectation of the category-dependent posterior of T. Thus we have
E
￿
T |s, cj￿ = n￿
i
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿ E [T |s, ai]. (A8)
We will now express the posterior of the category, the weights in the above sum, through known distributions.
P (A|S,C) = P (A, S,C)
P (S,C)
= P (C |A) P (A) P (S|A)
P (S,C)
= P (C |A) P (A) P (S|A)￿
k
P (C |ak) P (S|ak) P (ak) . (A9)
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We reused the factorization of P(A,S,C) derived above. In the denominator we use it tomarginalize outA. All distributions appearing
in the result are known from our model assumptions, except P(S |A). It results from integrating over t :
P (S|A) =
￿
P (S, t |A) dt =
￿
P (S|t ) P (t |A) dt . (A10)
Since both P(S | t ) and P(t |A) are normally distributed, integrating over t yield the following distribution:
S|A ∼ N ￿µA , σ2S + σ2A￿ . (A11)
Remember that we assume equal variances for all categories.
A special case of this model is if no cue is present. This corresponds to a case where all cues appear with equal probability inde-
pendently of the given category, P(cj | ai)= 1/n, and thus tell us nothing about the category. This leads to the posterior of A becoming
independent of C :
P (A|S,C) = 1/nP (A) P (S|A)￿
k
1/nP (S|ak) P (ak) =
P (A) P (S|A)
P (S)
= P (A|S) . (A12)
With the posterior of the category now being independent of C, the expectation for T given measurement and cue in Eq. 33 above
reduces to Eq. 29 in Feldman et al. (2009). The Feldman model is thus a special case of our model.
It remains to compute the expectations of the category-dependent posteriors, E[T | s,ai]. These posteriors result from standard
Bayesian fusion of the likelihood for S and the prior P(T |A), as we have shown above:
P (T |S,A) = P (S|T ) P (T |A)
P (S|A) =
P (S|T ,A) P (T |A)
P (S|A) . (A13)
Since both the likelihood P(S |T ) and the prior P(T |A) are normally distributed, the posterior is normally distributed with mean and
variance
µi = sσ
2
A + µaiσ2S
σ2S + σ2A
σ2i =
σ2Sσ
2
A
σ2S + σ2A
. (A14)
That allows us to write the expectation as
E
￿
T |s, cj￿ = n￿
i
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿ sσ2A + µaiσ2S
σ2S + σ2A
=
n￿
i
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿ ￿ σ2A
σ2S + σ2A
s + σ
2
S
σ2S + σ2A
µai
￿
=
n￿
i
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿wms + n￿
i
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿ (1− wm)µai = wms + (1− wm) n￿
i
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿µai .
(A15)
This can be further simplified using another two of our model assumptions. First, we assume that, a priori, categories are uniformly
distributed, that is P(ai)= 1/n. Second, we assume that the correct cue appears with some probability P(cj | ai)= pC, j = i, while the
remaining wrong cues appear with equal probabilities P(cj | ai)= (1− pC)/(n–1). First we rewrite the posterior of the category:
P
￿
ai |s, cj￿ = P ￿cj |ai￿ · P (ai) P (s|ai)￿
k
P
￿
cj |ak
￿
P (s|ak) P (ak)
= P ￿cj |ai￿ · 1/nP (s|ai)
pCP
￿
s|aj￿ 1/n + 1−pCn−1 ￿
k ￿=j
P (s|ak) 1/n
= P ￿cj |ai￿ · P (s|ai)
pCP
￿
s|aj￿+ 1−pCn−1 ￿
k ￿=j
P (s|ak)
= P ￿cj |ai￿ · αi,j (s) .
(A16)
This results in
E
￿
T |s, cj￿ = wms + (1− wm) n￿
i
P
￿
cj |ai￿ αi,j (s)µAi . (A17)
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Then we can further rewrite by again replacing P(cj | ai) to get
E
￿
T |s, cj￿ = wms + (1− wm)
pCαj ,j(s)µaj + n￿
i ￿=j
1− pC
n − 1 αi,j (s)µai

= wms + (1− wm)
pCαj ,j (s)µaj + 1− pCn − 1
n￿
i ￿=j
αi,j (s)µai
 .
(A18)
CUE-COMBINATION MODEL
Our assumptions about the (conditional) distributions of target distance T, stimulus S and mapped cue Cmp (the cue signal) lead to
the following factorization of the model’s full joint probability:
P
￿
T , S,Cmp
￿ = P (S|T ) P ￿Cmp|T ￿ P (T ) . (A19)
From this, the posterior follows immediately:
P
￿
T |S,Cmp￿ = P ￿T , S,Cmp￿
P
￿
S,Cmp
￿ = αP (S|T ) P ￿Cmp|T ￿ P (T ) ∝ P (S|T ) P ￿Cmp|T ￿ P (T ) . (A20)
We can, see that the posterior density function is, apart from the proportionality factor α= 1/P(S,Cmp), a product of Gaussians.
First, we combine the two likelihood density functions. Following the product rule for Gaussians, this product yields a Gaussian with
the following parameters:
µCS = sσ
2
C + cσ2S
σ2S + σ2C
σ2CS =
σ2Sσ
2
C
σ2S + σ2C
. (A21)
In the indices we write C instead of Cmp for brevity and better readability, e.g., µCS instead of µCmpS . A problem is that the
(unknown) mean of the symbolic cue likelihood, µC(T ), depends non-linearly on T. However, we may assume that this dependence
is approximately linear. Remember that our model receives as input a discrete cue, which steers a calibration process (implemented
by a Kalman filter), whose output in each trial is then interpreted as additional measurement cmp of the mapped cue. This output of
the calibration process closely follows the stimuli from either the long or the short range, depending on the discrete cue. The ranges
themselves do not change and therefore a normal distribution with fixed µC(T ) (after a short calibration period) can approximate the
dispersion of the cmp values.
The product of the combined likelihood density function with the density of the prior P(T ) is again a product of Gaussians resulting
in a Gaussian. The density of the posterior is thus Gaussian with parameters
µposterior = µTσ
2
CS + µCSσ2T
σ2CS + σ2T
σ2posterior =
σ2CSσ
2
T
σ2CS + σ2T
. (A22)
According to standard probability theory, the expectation of the posterior is then given as
E
￿
T |s, cmp￿ = µposterior = σ2CS
σ2CS + σ2T
µT + σ
2
T
σ2CS + σ2T
µCS = (1− wfu)µT + wfuµCS
= (1− wfu)µT + wfu sσ
2
C + cmpσ2S
σ2S + σ2C
= (1− wfu)µT + wfu
￿
σ2C
σ2S + σ2C
s + σ
2
S
σ2S + σ2C
cmp
￿
= (1− wfu)µT + wfu
￿
wms + (1− wm) cmp￿ = (1− wfu)µT + wfu ￿(1− wm) cmp + wms￿
(A23)
with the weights
wfu = σ
2
T
σ2CS + σ2T
1− wfu = 1− σ
2
T
σ2CS + σ2T
= σ
2
CS + σ2T − σ2T
σ2CS + σ2T
= σ
2
CS
σ2CS + σ2T
wm = σ
2
C
σ2S + σ2C
1− wm = 1− σ
2
C
σ2S + σ2C
= σ
2
S + σ2C − σ2C
σ2S + σ2C
= σ
2
S
σ2S + σ2C
(A24)
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4 D ISCUSS ION AND CONCLUS ION
There are things known and there
are things unknown, and in between
are the doors of perception.
Aldous Huxley
In this thesis systematic effects in human path integration be-
havior are studied. We find that human estimation of distances
and turning angles exhibits behavioral characteristics that are
omnipresent in human magnitude estimation (range effect, re-
gression effect, scalar variability). We provide evidence that
these characteristics can be explained by the use of a-priori as-
sumptions for the current estimate of displacement. Finally, we
show that this influences performance in way that is predicted by
iterative Bayesian estimation models that implement the Weber-
Fechner law and are capable of incorporating and updating a-
priori knowledge.
4.1 a bayesian approach to magnitudeestimation
While this work focussed on human path integration, it is
likely that the iterative Bayesian approach presented can pro-
vide a comprehensive account for the systematic characteristics
in magnitude estimation behavior. Since, the characteristics ex-
plained by the model are ubiquitous across magnitude estima-
tion1. Three key assumptions are essential to the approach’s
success in modeling this behavior:
• Logarithmic Scaling: Measured magnitudes are internally
represented either as normal distributions with constant
1 The parallels in magnitude estimation behavior across different modalities
can be nicely visualized in the comparison between figure 2 in Jazayeri and
Shadlen [2010], which depicts human performance in time estimation for dif-
ferent test ranges and figure 3 in Petzschner and Glasauer [2011], which de-
picts nearly indistinguishable behavioral characteristics for human distance
and turning angle estimation.
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standard deviation on a logarithmic scale or as normal dis-
tributions with linear increase of standard deviation on a
linear scale.
• Bayesian Inference: Estimated magnitudes are the result
of Bayesian inference based on the current measurement
and a-priori assumptions.
• Online Update of Prior Knowledge: The a-priori assump-
tions are based on past experience and/or additional infor-
mation about the stimulus and are constantly updated.
In the following three subsections, I will discuss the general va-
lidity and implications of each assumption of the Bayesian ap-
proach in the context of magnitude estimation.
4.1.1 Magnitude Estimation on Logarithmic Scales
The logarithmic scaling assumption is rooted in the early find-
ings of Weber [1850] who discovered that the just-noticeable dif-
ference between two stimulus magnitudes increases with the
stimulus size. The accompanying linear increase in the stan-
dard deviation of estimates with the mean is termed constant
coefficient-of-variation or scalar variability, corresponding to the
two competing mathematical explanations of the phenomenon:
Either magnitudes are, as proposed by Fechner, represented on a
logarithmic scale with constant noise leading to an proportional
increase in standard deviation with the mean on linear scales; or
they are represented on linear scales with a corresponding linear
increase in the standard deviation of the internal noise2 [Cantlon
et al., 2009; Feigenson et al., 2004; Gibbon, 1977]. In other words,
either we have a tendency to compress the range of magnitudes
onto a logarithmic scale such that larger magnitudes are repre-
sented with a lower resolution; or our estimates simply become
noisier with increasing stimulus magnitude [Cantlon et al., 2009;
Dehaene et al., 2008]. It was pointed out that the two theories are
hardly discriminable, as the ’[...] linear coding with scalar variabil-
ity and logarithmic coding with fixed variability lead to the same metric
of number similarity, and therefore to the same behavior.’ [Dehaene,
2001]. Some support for the logarithmic coding hypothesis has
recently come from animal studies. Nieder and Miller [2003]
tested both behavioral and neuronal representations of numeri-
cal information in the prefrontal cortex of rhesus monkeys. They
found a nonlinear compression of numerical scale, as it would
2 This corresponds to the usual assumption about signal-dependent noise in the
motor system.
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be postulated by the psychophysical laws, both on a neuronal
level as well as on a behavioral level [Dehaene, 2003; Nieder and
Miller, 2003; Nover et al., 2005].
For our iterative Bayes model, both coding types would be fea-
sible and should in principle yield similar results. We chose to
use the logarithmic transformation of magnitudes to account for
the linear increase in standard deviation, because it represents
an implementation of the Weber-Fechner law and leads to sim-
plified computations of the Bayesian estimate.
4.1.2 Magnitude Estimation as Bayesian Inference
A core assumption of our approach is that systematic behav-
ior in magnitude estimation can be described by Bayesian infer-
ence. This does not, however, imply that magnitude estimation
is mechanistically Bayesian estimation. There is currently an on-
going debate among neuroscientists, related to this issue. The
controversy is about to what extent perception can be regarded
as Bayesian inference3.
Some proponents of Bayes promote the conception that percep-
tion is Bayesian inference [Friston and Stephan, 2007; Knill and
Pouget, 2004; Knill and Richards, 1996]. Support for this view
comes from the remarkable successful of Bayesian estimation
at explaining all kinds of perceptual processes including mo-
tion perception [Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006], visual illusions
[Weiss et al., 2002], sensory-motor learning [Körding et al., 2004],
sensory cue-combination [Ernst and Banks, 2002], and specific
cases of magnitude estimation [Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010; Jür-
gens and Becker, 2006]. These studies motivated conclusions
that ’human perception is close to the Bayesian optimal suggesting
the Bayesian process may be a fundamental element of sensory process-
ing’ [Körding and Wolpert, 2006] or, analogously, that there are
’myriad ways in which human observers behave as optimal Bayesian
observers’ [Knill and Pouget, 2004].
Generalizing statements like these brought opponents to the sta-
ge. They question whether the Bayesian approach can effectively
explain perceptual processes and have put forward some impor-
tant criticisms [Bowers and Davis, 2012a; Colombo and Series,
2012; Jones and Love, 2011]:
First, even if humans behave according to Bayesian estimation,
it does not mean that this algorithm is implemented in the brain
[Bowers and Davis, 2012a]. To prove the implementation of the
3 In fact, there is currently a heated debate on this issue in the Psychological
bulletin [Bowers and Davis, 2012a,b; Griffiths et al., 2012].
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Bayesian framework in the brain, one would need to show that
populations of neurons can both represent probability distribu-
tions and carry out the necessary Bayesian computations. There
have been various theoretical attempts to model Bayesian com-
putations on a neuronal level [Beck et al., 2008; Denève et al.,
2007; Ma and Pouget, 2008], but there is still little experimental
evidence from neuronal recordings for an actual implementation
[Fetsch et al., 2012].
De facto, only a subgroup of Bayes proponents have this strong
theoretical view4 [Bowers and Davis, 2012a]. The majority uses
the approach as a measure of performance. Their methodological
view does not imply an actual implementation of Bayesian com-
putations but gives teleological explanations of why it may make
sense to show a specific behavior [Bowers and Davis, 2012a; Grif-
fiths et al., 2012].
The work presented here is of this methodological type. On
the basis of behavioral data it cannot be distinguished whether
humans carry out Bayesian magnitude estimation5 or any alter-
native computation at the algorithmic level. However, the behav-
ioral findings can still provide insights to features of the under-
lying processes, inasmuch as any algorithmic account of mag-
nitude estimation should factor in the incorporation of a-priori
evidence that results in the characteristic behavior.
The second criticism concerns the flexibility of the approach.
Bowers and Davis [2012a] argue that ’there are too many arbitrary
ways that priors, likelihoods, utility functions, etc., can be altered in
a Bayesian theory post hoc’. The claim can be illustrated by a
Gedankenexperiment: Bayes’ theorem yields the probability of a
hypothesis to be true, given evidence and a-priori assumptions.
It is, thus, highly depended on each of these components. Con-
sider, for example, that we want to determine whether it will
be raining on a particular day by looking at the sky. Our sub-
jective belief (posterior) would depend on both the likelihood
(’It is cloudy outside.’ or ’It is sunny.’) and our prior (e.g. the
general rain probability in Munich or Seattle). Consequently,
a change in either of the components would greatly affect our
weather forecast. Similarly, a Bayes model that does not define
both the likelihood and the prior based on actual experimental
evidence, but uses priors (or likelihoods) which lead to a best
fit of the data, cannot provide mechanistic insights. A typical
4 Terms are chosen according to Bowers and Davis [2012a]. For an argument
against this devision, see Griffiths et al. [2012].
5 In the sense that the brain represents priors and likelihoods, and their respec-
tive reliability in form of probability distributions and multiplies these distri-
butions to come up with an a-posteriori estimate.
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example for such an arbitrary adjustment of priors is a Bayesian
approach to speed perception [Weiss et al., 2002]. In that study,
the authors suggest that humans have a prior that represents a
preference for low speeds. They chose this prior as it best ex-
plained the behavioral data, but admitted that there is ’no direct
evidence (either from first principles or from empirical measurements)
that this assumption is correct.’ [Weiss et al., 2002].
Yet, the criticism described above is not inherent to Bayes mod-
els, but holds for any model that depends on the adjustment of
free parameters. Often, there is no justification for the choice of
the free parameters. The reason why this has become such an
important issue in the case of Bayesian estimation is that these
models usually come up with an interpretation of prior, likeli-
hood, or utility function, while many alternative modeling ap-
proaches have no need to justify their free parameters [Griffiths
et al., 2012].
Fortunately, often the prior and likelihood are constrained by
fundamental knowledge [Vilares and Kording, 2011]. In the
study in chapter 2, the prior and likelihood are derived from
the preceding and the current test stimuli alone [Petzschner and
Glasauer, 2011]. Not every teleological explanation provides,
however, a correct mechanistic explanation of the behavior. The
second study in chapter 3 reveals that, with additional informa-
tion sources being available, different generative models can ac-
count equally well for the same behavior [Petzschner et al., 2012].
4.1.3 Online Update of a-priori Knowledge
What distinguishes the present framework from most other
Bayesian approaches to human magnitudes estimation is the con-
tinuous update of prior knowledge.
Priors in Bayesian models are often fixed quantities or natural
statistics, such as the prior that ’light comes from above’ (see fig-
ure 3b) [Howard et al., 2009; Mamassian et al., 2002]. And even if
it is shown that the mean and weighting of the prior can change
due to experience [Adams et al., 2004; Tassinari et al., 2006],
there are only few accounts of how these priors are learned and
adapted [Berniker et al., 2010; Verstynen and Sabes, 2011].
In magnitude estimation, stimuli can be spread over wide ranges
and the behavior is highly dependent on these ranges (e.g. range
effect). Therefore, it seems necessary to implement an adaptive
component, that allows us to change our a-priori assumptions.
The two Bayesian approaches to magnitude estimation that are
the most closely related to this work avoid an adaptive compo-
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nent [Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010; Jürgens and Becker, 2006]. In-
stead, they use task-specific default priors to model the behavior.
These priors are located somewhere in the middle between the
largest and smallest stimulus magnitude of the respective test
range. As we have shown, such a default value can account for
the range and regression effect, but fails to explain additional
variability due to the order in which stimuli are presented (see
chapter 1.2, Sequential Effects). In addition, they lack an explana-
tion of how this task-specific knowledge is acquired, as subjects
cannot have the knowledge of the full stimulus range at hand.
The strength of the framework presented in this thesis is that
the online incorporation of prior experience explains a number
of systematic behavioral characteristics, without assuming any
explicit knowledge of the underlying stimulus range. Current
estimates are biased by the preceding trials, which results auto-
matically in a shift of the responses towards the center of the un-
derlying sample distribution. This explains how the regression
effect can already be observed in the first few trials [Stevens and
Greenbaum, 1966] and in experiments where each subject per-
forms only a single judgement for a specific magnitude [Stevens
and Poulton, 1956]. In addition, an online-updated prior pro-
vides the basis for sensorimotor learning without feedback.
Notably, a-priori knowledge is not restricted to prior experience.
The study in chapter 3 has shown that abstract explicit knowl-
edge (provided by a written, verbal cues) influences the estima-
tion process similar to experience. This suggests that humans
can exploit and incorporate all kinds of information sources for
perceptual decision making [Michel and Jacobs, 2008; Petzschner
et al., 2012].
4.2 towards a unifying account of mag-nitude estimation
So far I have focussed on the Bayesian approach as a model-
ing framework for magnitude estimation behavior. Here, I will
discuss the implications of our work for the interpretation of the
classical psychophysical laws and its relation to other unifying
principles in magnitude estimation.
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4.2.1 Implications for the Psychophysical Laws
Bayes links Weber-Fechner and Stevens. The most well-known
principles in magnitudes estimation were probably proposed by
Fechner and Stevens [Fechner, 1860; Stevens, 1961]. Both of them
believed that a simple mathematical relationship exists between
the intensity of a stimulus and the subjective sensation that it
causes. Furthermore, this relationship can be derived from the
stimulus-response function in magnitude estimation. Although
their methodological approaches as well as their conclusions re-
lating sensation to physical magnitude were fundamentally dif-
ferent, there have been a number of attempts to unify the two
approaches [Ekman, 1964; MacKay, 1963].
The Bayesian approach presented in this thesis reveals a new un-
expected link between the Weber-Fechner and Stevens’ power-
law. When we assume that the Weber-Fechner law holds and
coding of magnitudes takes place on logarithmic scales [Fechner,
1860], then the proposed Bayesian estimation takes also place
on logarithmic scales. Hence, to reproduce a magnitude on lin-
ear scales the logarithmic estimate needs to be back-transformed.
This transformation yields a power-law dependence between the
responded magnitude R and the stimulus intensity I of the form6
R = c · Iwpp Iws (4.1)
where wp and ws are the respective weighting of prior intensity
Ip and the current stimulus intensity I.
This closely resembles Stevens’ power-law, where the response
R is assumed to be a direct reflection to the subjective sensation
S [Stevens, 1961]:
S = c · In (4.2)
A Bayesian estimation on logarithmic scales thus results in a
power-law relation on linear scales. The exponent of this Bayesian
power function is, in contrast to Stevens’ empirical exponent n,
derived from a concrete theoretical framework.
Log versus power-function. How can we interpret this link between
logarithmic and power-law? Let us consider the different cases
in which we observe a power or a logarithmic function.
Logarithmic stimulus-response relationships are commonly ob-
served when subjects are asked to discriminate between stimu-
lus magnitudes. Stevens referred to these methods as indirect
6 Nomenclature for equation 9 in chapter 2 is adjusted to that of Stevens’ power-
law in section 1.1.1. The constant c in equation 4.1 and 4.2 reflects different
values.
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scaling. The power-law, in contrast, is usually observed in di-
rect scaling methods, where magnitude estimates are made on a
ratio scale [Stevens, 1956]. Examples of the latter case include
magnitude judgments based on assigning numbers in propor-
tion to the sensation evoked (magnitude estimation7), matching
the magnitude of a stimulus in one modality to the magnitude
of another modality (cross-modality matching), or matching stim-
uli of the same modality (uni-modal matching8).
Stevens believed that the direct scaling methods yield the stimu-
lus transformation function relating the stimulus to the subjective
sensation, S = f1(I). Therefore, he concluded that the power
function, empirically obtained from direct scaling methods, pro-
vides a measure of subjective sensation.
A number of scientists, in particular Shepard [1981], already
pointed out that there is a flaw in Stevens’ description. The
subjective sensation itself is a hidden variable and accordingly
cannot be measured directly. What is measured, is the response
to the stimulus intensity and this response is linked to the sub-
jective sensation via a second transform, the response transforma-
tion function, R = f2(S). Accordingly, the measured stimulus-
response relationship, which in Stevens’ case corresponds to a
power function, is reflected by a third function R = f3(I) =
f2[f1(I)]. Stevens’ conclusion that this power function allows for
a direct measure of subjective sensation would therefore imply
that f2 is linear. But as Shepard and others correctly pointed out,
this has not been proved to be the case [Attneave, 1962; Geschei-
der, 1988; MacKay, 1963; Shepard, 1981].
The Bayesian approach, in fact, proposes that there are differ-
ent transformation steps in the process of magnitude estimation,
and even more important that these transformation steps can ex-
plain the different stimulus-response relationship observed with
direct and indirect scaling methods. After a logarithmic stimulus
transformation, the measured stimulus and a-priori knowledge
are combined to yield an estimate of the magnitude, still on log-
arithmic scales. In order to give a response on an absolute scale
(e.g. the stimulus scale) a back-transformation (response trans-
formation function) of the estimate is necessary that leads to a
power-law dependence between stimulus and response (equa-
tion 4.1). This last transformation is only required if subjects
have to make a response on an absolute scale. If, however, the
response requires a mere comparison of two stimuli, then the es-
timate on logarithmic scales should be sufficient to solve the task.
7 Here, the term corresponds to the method proposed by Stevens.
8 The production-reproduction paradigm used to test path integration through-
out this thesis can be considered as a type of unimodal matching.
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In other words, a power-function is predicted in all cases where
a back-transformation is necessary, that is, when subjects are
asked to adjust or reproduce a magnitude on its own physical
scale or that of another modality (including the number scale),
as in the case of Stevens’ direct scaling methods. If the response,
however, does not require a back-transformation into the stim-
ulus space, e.g. in a discrimination task, where the response is
’longer’-’shorter’ or ’bigger’-’smaller’, then one would observe
a logarithmic stimulus-response relationship as predicted by the
Weber-Fechner law and observed with indirect scaling methods.
Accordingly, the stimulus-response function observed depends
on the transformations required to solve the task at hand. The
view further implies that the response in any magnitude estima-
tion task - direct or indirect - will always reflect an estimate of
magnitude and not subjective sensation.
A re-interpretation of Stevens’ power-law exponents. As outlined
briefly above, the exponents of the power function in the Bayes
approach are derived from a concrete mathematical framework.
Therefore, Stevens’ fitted power-law exponents can be re-inter-
preted as the weighting of prior and measurement and conse-
quently as an uncertainty associated with the magnitude mea-
surements (compare equation 4.1 and 4.2).
The first evidence for a link between uncertainty and power-
law exponents comes from a number of studies that reported
an increase of the regression effect with increasing task diffi-
culty [Kappauf, 1975; Sheldon, 1973; Stevens and Greenbaum,
1966; Thomas, 1949]. The iterative Bayesian estimation model ex-
plains the regression towards the center of the underlying sam-
ple range by the incorporation of the immediate prior experi-
ence. The weighting of prior experience, and consequently the
regression, should increase if the sensory information provided
is experienced as being less reliable. This the case when the task
difficulty increases.
The second evidence comes from the range effect itself. If we
assume that stimuli are represented on logarithmic scales, then
their respective uncertainty increases with the stimulus magni-
tude (scalar variability), without increasing the difficulty of the
task itself. This leads to a stronger regression towards the center
for larger stimulus ranges, known as the range effect [Teghtsoo-
nian, 1973; Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian, 1978].
Limits of the Bayesian approach. The Bayesian approach should
prove applicable to a wide range of magnitude estimation data,
for which Stevens determined a power-law relationship - with
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one important exception. The exponent of the Bayes model is
determined by a relative weighting of measurement and prior.
It can, therefore, not be bigger than one. Nevertheless, Stevens
found modalities with exponents that exceed one, e.g. the esti-
mation of pain from electric shock [Stevens, 1960b].
However, this does not necessarily disqualify the Bayesian ap-
proach for these modalities, as the fitted exponents might ac-
tually not yield an absolute modality-specific value. The most
common methods for determining the exponents are magnitude
estimation9 and cross-modal matching. Both require the trans-
formation from one modality to the scale of another modality (in
the case of magnitude estimation the number scale). This match-
ing might yield fitted exponents that differ from the modality-
specific ones [Attneave, 1962; Ekman, 1964]: If we assume that
two given modalities yield a logarithmic dependence such that
S1 = c1 +n1 · ln(I1) S2 = c2 +n2 · ln(I2) (4.3)
and the task is to match one modality with the other (e.g. to
match a number to the loudness of a tone), than setting S1 = S2
yields
I1 = e
c2−c1
n1 · In2/n12 (4.4)
Consequently, the exponent obtained from cross-modality match-
ing and magnitude estimation might be a fraction of the modality-
specific exponents10 n1 and n2 [Attneave, 1962; Wagenaar, 1975].
Our iterative Bayesian estimation model can be extended in a
similar way to cross-modal matching. Here, we would assume
that the matching takes place on logarithmic scales. The modal-
ity to be matched S1 is thus adjusted to the estimate11 of the
experienced modality Sˆ2, such that Sˆ2 = n · S1. This would
yield
I1 = e
c
n · Iws,2/n2 (4.5)
where n is a constant, that represents a linear scaling transfor-
mation from one modality to the other on logarithmic scales and
9 Here, the term corresponds again to the method proposed by Stevens.
10 It is not necessary to assume that the modalities yield a logarithmic relation-
ship, a similar relation is obtained if we assume that they yield a power-law
relation, S = c · In, then the analog matching yields: c1 · In11 = c2 · In22 and
consequently I1 = n1
√
c2
c1
· In2/n12 [Attneave, 1962]. In all equations, c refers
to different constant terms.
11 Sˆ2 reflects already the weighted Bayesian estimate (see chapter 2, equation 3).
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ws,2 is the weighting of the stimulus intensity I2.
Accordingly, if the exponent of the matching modality is smaller
that one, then the fitted exponent would yield a value that is
larger than the modality-specific value and also larger than one.
This holds true independent of whether we assume a logarith-
mic, a power-function or a Bayesian estimation stage for the
matching. In other words, it is possible that Stevens’ exponent
are larger than one, although the modality-specific exponents
are smaller than one. In these cases, the Bayesian approach
would still be valid.
4.2.2 Magnitude Estimation across Modalities
Subject-specific Variability. Part of the fascination for magnitude
estimation is driven by the consistency in the behavior across
modalities. The incorporation of prior experience can explain
some of this consistency, but not the subject-dependent corre-
lations observed in chapter 2. There, we separately tested the
estimation of two distinct magnitudes, turning angles and dis-
tances. A comparison of the model predictions revealed that
subjects put nearly equal weights on angular and linear displace-
ment measurements and that this correlation in weighting was
significant for the whole group of subjects. This finding seems
trivial at first glance, because the virtual environment did not
change and one would assume that subjects received a similar
sensory input in both tasks. In fact, however, a rotational move-
ment yields a completely different pattern of optic flow than
linear motion. A recent study found an age-related increase of
thresholds for translational motion, but no effect on radial flow
processing, suggesting specialized neuronal processing mecha-
nisms for the different types of optic flow [Billino et al., 2008].
Therefore, the correlation in behavior turns out to be rather sur-
prising. If it is not the global input, then where does the correla-
tion come from?
The weighting of prior experience and current measurement is
determined by their associated uncertainty. This uncertainty
could be a task-specific parameter that is not directly related
to the global, but possibly to local optic flow detection. Other-
wise, it could also be a subject-dependent parameter reflecting
similar processing mechanisms for magnitude estimation across
modalities.
Support for the latter hypothesis is provided by studies of mag-
nitude estimation which reported a subject-dependent correla-
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tion in the Stevens’ power-law exponents for circle size, number,
and line length or weights, tastes, and smells [Jones and Marcus,
1961; Robinson, 1976]. An extension to Stevens’ power-law was
proposed that includes a subject-dependent variable in the expo-
nent to capture this correlation [Jones and Marcus, 1961]. This
factor enters the exponent at the same location as the weights
in the Bayesian approach. Therefore this parameter could analo-
gously reflect some kind of subject-dependent uncertainty.
A common metric of magnitudes in the brain? The subject-dependent
correlations and a variety of other studies linking space, time,
and quantities (e.g. [Casini and Macar, 1997; Dehaene et al.,
1998; Glasauer et al., 2009]) have provided evidence for a general-
ized magnitude system across modalities. For instance, Dehaene
et al. [2008] concluded that ’mathematical objects may find their ul-
timate origin in basic intuitions of space, time, and number that have
been internalized through millions of years of evolution in a structured
environment and that emerge early in ontogeny, independently of edu-
cation’. Similar ideas have been proposed by Walsh [2003]. In his
Theory Of Magnitude (ATOM), he suggests that space, quantity,
and time are linked by ’a common metric for action’ and that the
’apparent specializations for time, space, and quantity develop from a
single magnitude system operating from birth’. The area in the brain
where this common processing of magnitudes is assumed take
place is the parietal cortex [Bueti and Walsh, 2009].
The problem in testing ideas like this is that it often is tricky
to compare modalities, like sound, pressure, or time as they
are measured in different arbitrary units [Poulton, 1968]. The
Bayesian approach provides a unit-less measure of behavior in
form of an individual weighting of prior and measurement, thus
allowing for a direct comparison between different types of mag-
nitudes. The unit-less measure can be used to reveal similari-
ties in the estimation of magnitudes across modalities, not only
on a behavioral level, but also on a neuronal level, making the
approach potentially relevant for the analysis of neuroimaging
studies.
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4.3 concluding remarks
The convergence of experimental findings on human magni-
tude estimation behavior across modalities and tasks encour-
ages me to believe that a unifying approach exists for human
magnitude estimation. The framework presented in this thesis
can provide the basis for such an approach. It re-interpretes
some of the classical findings in human magnitude estimation.
It relates the two seemingly contradicting psychophysical laws
(log and power function) and brings together the characteristic
effects (regression effect, range effect, within-subject consisten-
cies) in a single mathematical framework. Furthermore, context-
dependent variability in behavior becomes a tractable and inter-
pretable problem and the individual weighting can be used as a
unit-less measure of subject-specific behavior.
This work also opens many research avenues. So far, the frame-
work has only been applied to human path integration. Al-
though, it seems applicable to a wide range of magnitude es-
timation data, its performance remains to be tested for other
modalities. Furthermore, the conclusion that characteristic mag-
nitude estimation behavior is the result of an incorporation of
a-priori knowledge, leads to a number of related questions. Is
this incorporation of knowledge task-dependent, i.e. is informa-
tion only used when an action is required? Also, the current
iterative Bayesian model for path integration incorporates that a
given state-of-the-world changes on a very slow time scale. The
prediction would, therefore, be that some of the characteristic
errors in path integration are driven by the fact that most ex-
periments simulate a very rapidly changing environment. What
would consequently happen if the experiment tested more natu-
ral, slowly changing stimuli? I believe that some of these, and
related issues can be assessed solely based on behavioral studies.
An overarching understanding of the processes underlying mag-
nitude estimation will, however, require the contribution of a
wide range of technologies, including electrophysiology and neu-
roimaging. In particular, we currently have very little knowledge
on how the mechanistic processes and different transformation
stages of magnitude estimation are realized at the neuronal level.
An area that, I believe, might play a key role in this process is
the parietal cortex, as this brain region is associated with both,
the processing of time, magnitude, and number and the coding
of prior expectation and evidence.
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